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ABSTRACT

This Article examines the critical shortage of lawyers in Africa,
using Zambia as a case study. The Article draws on information
from a variety of sources, including field interviews, survey data,
and case data from Zambian courts, in addition to secondarysource material. Though other work has dealt with access to
justice in Africa broadly and with issues that affect access to justice,
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including African legal education, prison conditions, and
alternatives to formal legal representation, this Article is the first
comprehensive analysis of the causes of the scarcity of African
lawyers, the effects of the shortage, and potential avenues for
addressing the crisis, including measures for making more efficient
use of currently available legal resources and reforms to increase
the size of the African bar. Now, because of the extreme scarcity of
African lawyers, most criminal defendants go without
representation, and most Africans with civil claims have no
reasonable possibility of hiring a lawyer. The causes of this crisis
date to colonial policies that discouraged higher education for
native Africans. More recently, donor fatigue and the limited
availability of public resources for education, compounded by
World Bank and IMF austerity measures, have perpetuated the
problem. Likewise, poor policy choices at African law schools and
African bar admissions programs have exacerbated the dilemma.
Zambia, and other countries in the region, could enhance the
impact of their limited legal communities by allowing the use of
contingency fees, reducing or eliminating the civil caseloads of
overburdened and understaffed legal aid departments, and
making more extensive use of paralegals. African law schools
could improve the quality of their graduates by implementing
policies to combat rampant dereliction of duty by their faculties,
pedagogical reforms, and policies to increase student access to
learning materials. Additionally, low bar pass rates would likely
improve if bar admissions programs reformed their curricula,
changed hiring practices, and implemented transparent grading
practices. Ultimately, growth of the African bar is crucial to
ensuring adequate safeguards of the rights of criminal defendants,
litigating complex civil claims, negotiating the balance between the
competing traditions of the dual legal systems of most African
countries, and building and sustaining societies subject to the rule
of law.
1. INTRODUCTION
It takes a little over an hour on a Monday morning for Alice
Sitali to meet with four clients.1 The first one, she says, ―borrowed
some money from a Shylock,‖ to whom he has since paid back ten
1 The events described in this vignette are based on field notes taken in the
Lusaka office of Zambia‘s Legal Aid Board on Sept. 20, 2010.
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times the amount of the original loan. ―Did you sign any
agreement?‖ Mrs. Sitali asks, ―because even Shylocks have laws
that govern them. They‘re supposed to operate within the
limitations of the Moneylenders Act.‖
Before the client leaves, Mrs. Sitali warns him that to proceed
with an application for legal aid, ―you have to tell the truth, no
matter how embarrassing it is, or we won‘t help you.‖
Another client, a slightly disheveled young man wearing slipon canvas shoes, jeans, and a t-shirt, is seeking compensation from
a stone-crushing company where he was once employed.
Apparently, the company does not provide workers with
protective gear, and Mrs. Sitali‘s client went blind in one eye after a
stone splinter pierced his pupil. He hopes to get twenty-five
million kwacha2 for his injury.
As soon as one client leaves the office, another is at the door,
and by 10:30AM, Mrs. Sitali is sitting across from a slight man who
talks so softly that at first she is unable to understand him. ―I can‘t
get you,‖ Mrs. Sitali says, and the man speaks up. He is not her
client, but his lawyer has been unavailable, and he has a court date
the next day. Mrs. Sitali tells him she will try to find another
lawyer from the office to work on the case, which has been in
progress for almost five years. The man is a police officer, but he
was charged with attempted aggravated robbery, and he has been
suspended from work since his arrest. ―I feel that I am being
tortured, because the five years, it feels like it‘s doubled, it‘s like
ten years,‖ he says. He says there has been no trial date for almost
a year, and the last scheduled court date, in August, was delayed
again for the judge to attend a conference in Livingstone. The man
claims he was an innocent bystander at the robbery and that he
had never met his co-defendant before the trial began.
Mrs. Sitali is one of only seven legal aid lawyers in Lusaka and
one of only twenty-four in all of Zambia.3 She says the suspended
police officer‘s case is unusual. ―There are very few that go for five
years . . . but some do, sometimes the file goes missing.‖ She has
an amiably imperious presence as she presides over her office,
which seems to be an epicenter of department activity; secretaries
2 This amounts to a little under 5,000 USD at prevailing exchange rates as of
January 2012. See Currency Converter Widget, XE.COM, http://www.xe.com/ucc
/convert/?Amount=25000000&From=ZMK&To=USD (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
3 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, Acting Director of the Legal Aid Board,
in Lusaka, Zambia (Sept. 14, 2010) (on file with author).
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and legal apprentices filter into the room periodically, looking for
advice and asking questions. Flies buzz along the walls, searching
for an escape after infiltrating through the open, second-story
window, which overlooks an alley littered with an old desk and
dilapidated chairs and a severely wrecked pickup truck. Whatever
accident damaged the truck must also have resulted in human
carnage.
Mrs. Sitali‘s desk is neatly ordered and spare, with a few
stacked files on each side and a large laptop in the middle. A small
bookcase against the opposite wall houses several green binders
containing volumes of the Laws of Zambia, and a bulletin board
displays a duty roster, artwork by one of Mrs. Sitali‘s three
children, and a photo of colleagues from the office at a Labour Day
celebration. Mrs. Sitali wears a beige suit with a dark crew-neck
shirt. Sitting at her desk, she talks about her workload. She says
about seventy percent of her cases are criminal, but the High Court
refers most of those cases to the office, and a disproportionate
number of the clients who apply for legal aid directly have civil
claims.
According to Anderson Ngulube, Acting Director of Zambia‘s
Legal Aid Board, a quasi-governmental corporate body charged
with providing legal representation to indigent Zambians in both
criminal and civil cases, Mrs. Sitali‘s distribution of cases is fairly
typical for Legal Aid Board lawyers.4 He estimates that each of the
seven lawyers in the Lusaka office manages thirty-five to forty
cases a month, the majority of which are criminal cases in the High
Court and criminal appeals in the Supreme Court. Yet, with the
government initiating tens of thousands of new criminal cases each
year, there is little chance of assistance from a legal aid lawyer for
the average Zambian charged with a crime. In fact, Zambia faces a
critical shortage of lawyers. While the country‘s population is
nearly thirteen million,5 there are only 731 lawyers in private

4 Id. In fact, inspection of the Legal Aid Board‘s central registry reveals the
Board‘s caseload for 2009 was between 85.4 and 85.9% criminal. The Board took
2,127 criminal cases and 365 civil cases for all offices other than Mansa. Mansa
received 175 applications for representation in criminal cases and 11 applications
for representation in civil cases, but records from that office do not reveal how
many of the applications the office accepted. Id.
5 According to the World Bank, there were 12,926,409 people in Zambia in
2010.
See Data: Zambia, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org
/country/zambia (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
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practice in Zambia,6 approximately one lawyer for every 17,695
people. The few lawyers who are available are concentrated
heavily in urban areas, and, outside of Zambia‘s three largest cities,
there are only thirty-five private practitioners in the country.7
The result is a system in which most criminal defendants must
go without legal representation and most Zambians in need of any
form of legal assistance have no choice but to be their own
advocates. Meanwhile, a third of the more than 15,000 people
detained in Zambian prisons have not had trials,8 and many spend
years behind bars before the courts process their cases.9 Several
factors have likely led to the scarcity of Zambian lawyers. At
independence, in 1964, there were no Zambian lawyers,10 and,
since then, numbers have stayed low due to failures in the
Zambian legal academy and obstacles to bar admission. In large
measure, these failures result from inadequate funding and the
effects of the natural self-interests of monopolists. For most of
Zambia‘s history as an independent nation, the University of
Zambia (UNZA) maintained the country‘s only law school. The
6 Based on statistics gathered from the Law Association of Zambia offices on
Dec. 6, 2010 in Lusaka, Zambia.
7 See Directory, LAW ASS‘N OF ZAMBIA, http://www.laz.org.zm/directory.htm
(last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (listing the number of private legal practitioners in
Zambia who ―passed the chair‖). Interview with Edward Sakala, Executive
Secretary of the Law Association of Zambia, in Lusaka, Zambia (Nov. 30, 2010)
(on file with author).
8 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Unjust and Unhealthy: HIV, TB, and Abuse in
Zambian Prisons 4 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node
/89819/section/4/ (describing the growing number of people in Zambia‘s prison
system who await their trials for long periods of time in overcrowded and
unsanitary prison conditions).
9 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Zambia: Prison Conditions Endanger Inmates
(2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/04/27/zambia-prisonconditions-endanger-inmates (summarizing the findings of a Human Rights
Watch Report on the deteriorating conditions of Zambian prisons, specifically
focusing on the prison system‘s failure to ―provide basic nutrition, sanitation, and
housing for prisoners, and of the criminal justice system to ensure speedy trials
and appeals‖); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 4 (citing ―police
investigation failures, lack of bail, and lack of representation for accused persons‖
as the drivers of extended pre-trial incarcerations in Zambian prisons).
10 See Muna Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa in the Era of Globalization and
Structural Adjustment, 20 PENN ST. INT‘L L. REV. 487, 489 (2002) [hereinafter Ndulo,
Legal Education in Africa] (explaining the reasons behind the unavailability of legal
education in Africa during the colonial period, including an absence of in-country
educational facilities, the minor role of lawyers in ―colonial enterprise,‖ the
priority of training other professions, and the fear of providing legal education to
colonial subjects).
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lack of competition may have contributed to stagnation of Zambian
legal education, and a dramatic scarcity of public resources has
crippled the Zambian legal academy. In addition, the lawyers who
run the bar admissions program have incentives to keep the
number of Zambian lawyers low, to ensure that legal fees remain
high.
The shortage of lawyers in Zambia has had repercussions at
every level of the justice system. This Article will include analysis
of the causes and effects of that shortage, using Zambia as a case
study to examine similar problems, and potential solutions,
throughout the continent.11 Previous work has examined access to
justice in Africa broadly.12 Likewise, other authors have focused
on topics that touch on African access issues, including African
legal education,13 the application of customary law and various
customary legal traditions,14 and alternatives to formal legal
11 Like Zambia, countries throughout Africa have extremely low ratios of
lawyers to people. See infra Section 2, Table 1.
12 See generally ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING THE RULE OF
LAW A REALITY (PENAL REFORM INT‘L & BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC OF THE NW. UNIV. SCH.
OF LAW ed., 2007) (highlighting the problems surrounding the provision of legal
aid in Africa and suggesting innovative ways of solving them).
13 See generally Kirsten A. Dauphinais, Training a Countervailing Elite: The
Necessity of an Effective Lawyering Skills Pedagogy for a Sustainable Rule of Law Revival
in East Africa, 85 N.D. L. REV. 53, 108 (2009) (analyzing and offering solutions to
challenges confronted in legal education in Africa, with an aim towards offering
effective legal skills to be applied in the ―East African law school classroom‖);
Samuel O. Manteaw, Legal Education in Africa: What Type of Lawyer Does Africa
Need?, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 903 (2008) (detailing the history of African legal
education and recommending strategies for its improvement through ―legal
education reform‖); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 487
(―[D]iscusses legal education in Africa, its development, its present organization,
and the progress being made . . . in internationalizing legal education to meet the
challenges of the twenty-first century.‖).
14 See generally C.R. CUTSHALL, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE: COMMUNITY COURTS
AND LEGAL TRANSFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE 10 (1991) (assessing data from
Zimbabwe‘s community courts from 1981–1986 in an effort to provide a thorough
study of ―customary law in action‖); Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda, African Customary
Law and Customs: Changes in the Culture of Sexual Cleansing of Widows and the
Marrying of a Deceased Brother’s Widow, 11 GONZ. J. INT‘L L. 3 (2007-2008), available
at http://www.gonzagajil.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=168:african-customary-law-and-customs-changes-in-the-culture-of-sexualcleansing-of-widows-and-the-&catid=68:volume-11-issue-1-2007-2008&Itemid=26
(questioning the legality, under African customary law, of customs that encourage
the sexual cleansing of widows and restrict their property rights); Kenneth K.
Mwenda et al., Property-Grabbing Under African Customary Law: Repugnant to
Natural Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience, Yet a Troubling Reality, 37 GEO. WASH.
INT‘L L. REV. 949 (2005) (examining the failure of African customary law to
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representation.15
To date, however, no scholarship has
concentrated on access to justice issues through assessment of the
causes of the shortage of African lawyers and of potential
measures to increase the size of the African bar. This Article
provides such analysis, including recommendations both for
growing the Zambian bar and for making more efficient use of the
lawyers currently admitted to practice. While alternative legal aid
mechanisms, including using paralegals, can provide significant
benefits to people without access to lawyers, lawyers are crucial to
the effective adjudication of complex civil matters, to protect the
fundamental rights of people facing serious criminal charges, and
to ensure the development of a society subject to the rule of law.
Of course, increasing the number of lawyers in Zambia would
not, in and of itself, ensure the availability of legal services to
average Zambians. For example, in the United States, which has
more lawyers, both per capita and in absolute terms, than any
other country on earth,16 the poor face severe challenges in
accessing adequate legal assistance.17 But more competition in the
legal market would lower fees and, eventually, would force new
lawyers to seek work outside the population centers in which they
have currently clustered. Such growth, coupled with policy
improvements to increase the impact of the Zambian bar, given its

recognize formal wills and the resulting phenomenon of ―property-grabbing‖);
Abby Morrow Richardson, Women’s Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to
Integrate Cultural Understanding and Legal Reform, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19 (2003-2004)
(discussing the background behind women‘s nonexistent inheritance rights under
African customary law in Botswana, Ghana, and Zambia and highlighting the
need for culturally-sensitive reform).
15 See, e.g., Hillery Anderson, Justice Delayed in Malawi’s Criminal Justice
System: Paralegals vs. Lawyers, 1 INT‘L J. CRIM. JUST. SCI. 1 (2006) (evaluating the
shortcomings of legal aid in Malawi and the rise of paralegals as legal advisors for
the poor).
16 Marcia S. Krieger, A Twenty-First Century Ethos for the Legal Profession: Why
Bother?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 865, 875 (2009).
17 See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from Gideon
v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2006) (discussing the
difficulties faced by low-income Americans in vindicating their legal rights);
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001) (examining
inadequate access to justice in the American legal system and proposing strategies
for improving the system); Lua Kamal Yuille, Note, No One’s Perfect (Not Even
Close): Reevaluating Access to Justice in the United States and Western Europe, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 863 (2004) (critiquing the American and Western
European approaches to providing the poor with access to the legal system, and
offering proposals for reform that borrow from both models).
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present limited size, could significantly enhance access to justice in
Zambia.
Ultimately, there is a dire need for increasing the size of the
Zambian bar. Zambia, like most other sub-Saharan African
countries, faces terrible problems with poverty, corruption,
sickness, and social despair. To address these problems, Zambia,
and countries facing similar crises, must build the capacities of
their professional communities of doctors, scientists, agricultural
experts, industrialists, and engineers, as well as their legal
communities. Nonetheless, the task of building nations subject to
the rule of law is essential to allow people in any of these other
fields to reach their full potential, and lawyers are crucial to this
process. They enable a state to fulfill its promises in all categories
of life, creating predictability in the civil sphere and protection
from random abuses in the criminal sphere. To that end, ensuring
the growth of a country‘s legal community is as important as, and,
arguably, a prerequisite to, the effective development of its
communities of health workers, crop scientists, and entrepreneurs.
By evaluating the scarcity of lawyers in Zambia and exploring
possible reforms, I hope to provide insight on possibilities for
reform across the region and in other parts of the world.
In Section 2 of the Article, I will provide an overview of
Zambian legal history, with a focus on the institutional structure of
the justice system and the development of the Zambian legal
profession. Section 2 will also include a discussion of Zambia‘s
framework for provision of legal aid services. In Section 3 of the
Article, I will focus on criminal prosecutions and appeals in
magistrates‘ courts, the High Court, and the Supreme Court.
While the Zambian Constitution authorizes the High Court as a
court of unlimited original jurisdiction,18 subordinate courts,
creatures of statute overseen by magistrates, hear the vast majority
of criminal cases in Zambia.19 The Supreme Court has unlimited
appellate jurisdiction.20 Section 3 of the Article will examine the
sufficiency of legal representation in magistrates‘ courts and the
High Court, including services provided by the Legal Aid Board
18 See CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) art. 94(1)
(endowing the High Court with unlimited original jurisdiction except for cases
over which ―the Industrial Relations Court has exclusive jurisdiction‖).
19 See infra Section 3 (discussing the role of subordinate courts in Zambia and
how they operate).
20 CONST. OF ZAMBIA (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) art. 92(1).
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and by private lawyers through the Legal Aid Committee of the
Law Association of Zambia (LAZ). In Section 4, I will scrutinize
possible reasons for the relatively low numbers of lawyers in
Zambia, including challenges in Zambian legal education and the
difficulties law graduates face in gaining admission to the bar. In
Sections 4 and 5, I will examine alternatives to the use of lawyers
currently available to the Zambian citizenry. In Section 5, I will
provide a brief analysis of the workings of statutorily authorized
local courts, which administer customary law, and of traditional
courts, which function outside the formally sanctioned justice
system. The operations of these customary law courts provide
some relief from the strain Zambia‘s lack of lawyers puts on the
Western-style justice system. At the same time, the use of
customary law to suppress basic human rights, especially of
women, underscores the need to increase access to lawyers and to
the higher courts of Zambia‘s formal justice system. Section 6 of
this Article will be an analysis of substitutes for formal legal
representation in Zambia‘s common law courts, with a focus on the
role of paralegals. Due to liberal and ambiguous provisions of
Zambia‘s Legal Practitioners Act, paralegals are able to fill some of
the gaps left by the lack of sufficient numbers of lawyers to service
the country‘s legal needs. In Section 7, I will conclude the Article
with a discussion of possible avenues for improving access to
justice for Zambians, including possibilities for increasing the size
of the Zambian bar, for making more efficient use of lawyers
currently admitted to practice in Zambia, and for alternatives to
formal legal representation. Throughout the Article, I will provide
a comparative analysis of challenges confronting other African
countries and the institutional mechanisms available to meet those
challenges. Though I will include examples from around the
continent, I will focus, to some extent, on former British colonies,
whose common law systems and colonial histories most closely
resemble Zambia‘s.
2. EVOLUTION OF THE ZAMBIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM
Before Zambian Independence in 1964, the colony, known as
Northern Rhodesia, operated under a dual-court system in which,
except for serious criminal charges, common law courts were
reserved for white colonialists, whereas customary law courts
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resolved disputes between Africans.21 This system was typical of
Lawyers were excluded from the
British colonial Africa.22
customary courts, and when Zambia gained independence, there
were no black African lawyers in the country.23 In part, the early
lack of Zambian lawyers resulted from a broader failure to
promote education for native Africans. In fact, at independence
the country had no universities, and there were only 100 Zambian
graduates of foreign universities.24 Ninety-seven of these had
degrees in education, one was an engineer, and two were medical
doctors.25
Perhaps also at play was a desire by British colonial
administrators to discourage the development of a profession so
closely linked to political engagement and activism.26 To train
African lawyers would have risked undermining the system of
subjugation at the heart of the colonial enterprise. In fact, legal
education through domestic institutions in any English-speaking
African colony was almost non-existent, and African lawyers were

21 See Sally Engle Merry, Review Essay, Law and Colonialism, 25 L. & SOC‘Y
REV. 889, 897, 900 (1991) (―[T]his customary law, now touted as indigenous
African law and the basis for a new unified African legal system, is the product
of colonial relations and incorporates the inequalities of the colonial past.‖);
Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 489–90 n.10 (stating that, in
colonized African countries, a dual court system existed in which ―common law
courts were generally reserved for legal matters involving White colonialists, and
local customary courts were limited to disputes between Black African Natives‖).
22 See CUTSHALL, supra note 14, at 12–13 (explaining the operation of this
segmented court system in pre-Independence Zimbabwe); Merry, supra note 21, at
897 (noting that this ―dual court system‖ was typical of court systems in colonized
African countries); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10 at 489–90 n.10
(describing the segmented court system that characterized the ―colonial
enterprise‖ in colonized African countries).
23 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 489 (emphasizing the
absence of Black lawyers in Zambia when Zambia gained its independence).
24 Id. at 489–91.
25 Id.
26 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 55 (noting that ―British colonial
authorities had a deep-seated fear of lawyers[,]‖ in part because lawyers had led
the Indian nationalist movement); Manteaw, supra note 13, at 914 (explaining that
by discouraging the production of a class of lawyers, colonial governments hoped
to discourage the production of a class of politicians that could challenge the
colonial government); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 489
(arguing that the British discouraged the formation of a trained class of lawyers in
Zambia because the ―British considered it politically unwise to train African
lawyers, fearing that they would turn into agitators for political independence
upon their return to the colonies‖).
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almost unheard of before independence.27 In any case, in 1965, the
new country established its national university, UNZA, and
UNZA‘s law school started accepting students and gained formal
recognition in 1967.28
The following year, the country established the Law Practice
Institute, to train law graduates for admission to practice.29 In
1996, the National Assembly reconstituted the Institute as the
Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education (ZIALE), a
corporate body with a mandate similar to that of its predecessor.30
The curriculum at ZIALE involves a full academic year of postgraduate legal study, at the end of which candidates take
qualifying exams that determine whether they will be admitted to
Unfortunately, more than forty years after the
practice.31
establishment of UNZA‘s law school and the Law Practice
Institute, the country‘s community of legal practitioners is
insufficient to meet the needs of the Zambian people, and current
pass rates at ZIALE hover around ten percent.32 It would be
unreasonable to expect a country lacking lawyers to be capable of
building the profession to optimal levels in little more than a
generation. Nonetheless, policies at the University and at ZIALE
have hindered the growth of the profession, and reform could
promote the development of a larger, stronger community of
Zambian lawyers. I will discuss these issues in greater detail in
Sections 4 and 6.
Zambia‘s independence constitution established a Court of
Appeal (called the Supreme Court under the current constitution),
with essentially unlimited appellate jurisdiction, and a High Court,

27 By 1960, ―there was only one black African lawyer in . . . Tanganyika‖
(Tanzania), ten in Kenya, and twenty in Uganda. Dauphinais, supra note 13, at
55–56.
28 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 491 (explaining the
process by which the School of Law at UNZA was created and recognized).
29 Id. at 494 n.35.
30 Historical Background—Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education, ZAMBIA
INDEX, http://www.bwanji.net/zambiaindex.com/listing.php?idu=5013&needle
=address&sid=237&page=78&pearid=4992 (last visited Feb. 7, 2012); Interview
with Palan Mulonda, Director of ZIALE, in Lusaka, Zambia (Nov. 9, 2010) (on file
with author).
31 Interview with Palan Mulonda, Director of ZIALE, in Lusaka, Zambia
(Nov. 9, 2010) (on file with author).
32 Id.
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with unlimited original jurisdiction.33
Additionally, statutes
authorized the creation of subordinate courts, overseen by
magistrates, and local courts, which administered customary law.34
As under the colonial system, lawyers were not permitted to
represent clients in the customary law courts.35 Though the new
system abolished the dual framework by which black Africans and
whites were subject to entirely different rules, the retention of
customary law courts for some issues was a common feature of
most post-colonial African nations.36 While native Africans in
colonial Rhodesia arguably had little need for lawyers given the
primary position of customary law in their daily lives, the sudden
transition to a largely Western legal system required the creation of
a new cadre of professionals to assist with the system‘s
development and administration and to defend the rights of
people in conflict with that system.
Each of Zambia‘s three constitutions since independence has
included provisions for the protection of fundamental rights and
individual freedoms, and Part III of the current Constitution
contains these terms, many of which are roughly comparable to
provisions of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution.
These terms include protections for expressive behavior,37
protection against unreasonable searches of person and property,38
and protection from government seizure of property without
reasonable compensation.39
Crucially, Part III also includes
33 See Muna B. Ndulo & Robert B. Kent, The Constitutions of Zambia, 30 ZAM.
L.J. 1, 9 (1998) (describing the judicial structure under the 1964 Independence
Constitution).
34 Id.
35 See Ndulo, supra note 10, at 489–90.
36 See Adam Stapleton, Introduction and Overview of Legal Aid in Africa, in
ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING THE RULE OF LAW A REALITY 3, 4
(PENAL REFORM INT‘L & BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC OF THE NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW ed.,
2007) (―In most African countries, the formal (state) justice system functions
alongside traditional and informal (non-state) justice systems.‖). ―For reasons
ranging from history to culture, the average African is today subject to at least two
distinct, and sometimes conflicting, legal systems. Customary law usually
regulates family and allied relations, while statutory law regulates other aspects
of life.‖ Akua Kuenyehia, Women, Marriage, and Intestate Succession in the Context
of Legal Pluralism in Africa, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 387 (2006).
37 See CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) arts. 19–
21 (providing protections for freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and
freedom of assembly and association).
38 Id. art. 17.
39 Id. art. 16.
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safeguards for criminal defendants, guaranteeing a presumption of
innocence, compulsory process, and a fair trial, conducted within a
reasonable time by an independent, impartial court.40
Additionally, Part III guarantees every criminal defendant the right
to hire a private lawyer of his choosing or to a legal aid lawyer if
granted under the provisions of the Legal Aid Act.41 Guidelines of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights call for
legal aid in cases in which the ―interest of justice‖ requires it,42 and
most African constitutions, like Zambia‘s, recognize the right to
legal representation, though many specifically disclaim the right to
legal aid at public expense, and such assistance generally is not
widely available.43
Zambia‘s Legal Aid Act gives indigent defendants a definitive
right to assistance from counsel in all cases before the High Court.44
Likewise, any criminal appellant in the Supreme Court will be
provided with a legal aid lawyer if he cannot afford to hire a
lawyer on his own.45 There is no similar guarantee, however, for
criminal defendants facing charges in magistrates‘ courts.46 As I
will discuss in detail, magistrates‘ courts oversee most criminal
40 See id. art. 18 (promulgating rights for defendants charged with criminal
offenses).
41 Id. art. 18(2)(d) (providing criminal defendants the right to either retain a
private attorney or obtain representation via legal aid in accordance with
provisions enacted by Parliament).
42 See African Comm‘n on Human and Peoples‘ Rights [ACHPR], Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, § H(a),
ACHPR Doc DOC/OS(XXX) (2001) (stating that a criminal defendant or party to a
civil case ―has a right to have legal assistance assigned to him or her in any case
where the interest of justice so require‖). This language mirrors language from
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires free legal
assistance in criminal cases in which the ―interests of justice so require.‖
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(3)(d), opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The African Charter on Human and
Peoples‘ Rights guarantees a criminal defendant ―the right to be defended by
counsel of his choice.‖ Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, art. 7(1)(c),
opened for signature June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
43 See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 11–13. While Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi,
South Africa, and Sudan have some publicly employed legal aid lawyers,
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
Tanzania, and Uganda do not. Id. at 12 tbl.2.
44 See Legal Aid Act of 1967, Cap. 34, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA § 9.
45 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3.
46 See Legal Aid Act of 1967, Cap. 34, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA § 8 (failing to
include provisions providing indigent parties facing criminal charges before
magistrates a guaranteed right to legal counsel).
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cases in Zambia, and most of the defendants in those cases are
without representation.47 In civil cases, the Legal Aid Act gives the
Director of the Legal Aid Board, or a court adjudicating a claim,
discretion as to whether to grant legal aid to any party.48
Despite the guarantees of Part III of the Constitution and
similar conditions in previous Zambian constitutions, political and
economic realities have frequently reduced those guarantees to
little more than aspirational entreaties. Throughout Zambia‘s postcolonial history, an overbearing executive branch has threatened
the independence of the judiciary and compromised the sanctity of
fundamental individual rights, and despite promising early
developments, Zambia‘s fledgling democracy quickly morphed
into a centralized, authoritarian state.49 While the independence
constitution provided for presidential appointment of judges with
advice from a judicial service commission, the president could
appoint the chief justice entirely at his own discretion,50 and there
was initially no requirement that the National Assembly ratify any
of the president‘s judicial appointments.51 Moreover, although
judges on the Court of Appeal and the High Court could officially
be removed only for misbehavior or infirmity, the president could
appoint sitting judges to non-judicial government positions,
effectively forcing them to resign.52 Zambia‘s first president,
Kenneth Kaunda, who remained in power for twenty-seven years,
used this technique regularly to remove judges when he
disapproved of the opinions they issued.53
By 1972, Kaunda abandoned all pretense of pluralistic
democracy, pushing through a new constitution that officially
made Zambia a one-party state,54 and throughout President
See Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3.
See Legal Aid Act of 1967, Cap. 34, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA §§ 12–13.
49 See Ndulo & Kent, supra note 33, at 11, 14 (explaining that the government
turned Zambia into a one-party state in 1973, and noting ways in which the oneparty state undermined the Bill of Rights of the 1964 Constitution and other
liberties).
50 Id. at 9.
51 See id. at 18 (noting that parliamentary approval of a president‘s judicial
appointment was ushered in with the 1991 Constitution).
52 Id. at 9.
53 Id.
54 See B.O. NWABUEZE, PRESIDENTIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 222–25
(1974) (discussing President Kaunda‘s push for Zambia to transition to a oneparty state); see also Ndulo & Kent, supra note 33, at 11–12 (further detailing the
conditions leading to Zambia‘s transition to a one-party state).
47
48
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Kaunda‘s rule, he kept the country in an official state of
emergency, which he used to justify regular detentions without
trials as a means of intimidating opponents of the government.55
After the reintroduction of multi-party politics under the Third
Republican Constitution in 1991, President Frederick Chiluba
continued to declare states of emergency periodically to support
similar detentions.56 Even under Zambia‘s current constitution, the
president retains significant control over the judiciary. Although
the National Assembly must now ratify appointments to the
Supreme Court and to the High Court,57 the president can remove
Supreme Court judges at his discretion as long as the initial
appointment is for a limited term.58 Additionally, the president
can have High Court judges removed with the creation of ad hoc
tribunals, composed of as few as three members of his choosing.59
Presidential prerogative to remove judges has the potential to
significantly compromise the independence of the Zambian
judiciary.
Executive dominance has been typical of post-colonial African
states.60 To some extent, this scenario may have been an inevitable
consequence of the examples highly centralized, authoritarian
colonial regimes set for their independent successors.61 In any
55 See Ndulo & Kent, supra note 33, at 10 (noting frequent instances of
requests for judicial review in ―cases involving detention without trial, that is
detentions on the basis of an executively declared state of emergency‖).
56 See Isabel Apawo Phiri, President Frederick J.T. Chiluba of Zambia: The
Christian Nation and Democracy, 33 J. RELIGION AFR. 401, 412 (2003); see also H.
Kwasi Prempeh, Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling
Persistence of Imperial Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa, 35 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 761, 762 (2003).
57 See CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) arts. 93,
95 (requiring that the National Assembly confirm the Zambian president‘s judicial
appointments to the Supreme Court and High Court).
58 See id. art. 96.
59 Id. art. 98(3).
60 See generally Muna Ndulo, Presidentialism in Southern African States and
Constitutional Restraint on Presidential Power, 26 VT. L. REV. 769 (2002) (analyzing
generally the prevalence of disproportionately powerful executive branches in
southern African nations); NWABUEZE, supra note 54 (exploring themes pertaining
to the role of the executive branch in African states, including its high level of
dominance compared to other political branches).
61 The new African regimes inherited ―the full panoply of colonial legislation,
orders, ordinances, by-laws, and judicial precedents—upon which colonial
authority had been based.‖ H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review
and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239,
1265 (2006). Ultimately, it was ―the inherited (subconstitutional) legal order, not
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case, regular disregard for individual rights has accompanied
executive supremacy in Zambia, as in other African states. In some
measure, this state of affairs may result from the tendency of
traditional African societies to elevate community well-being
above personal rights.62 In fact, the primacy of collective welfare
was at the heart of President Kaunda‘s conception of a humanist
society.63 As in other African nations, this paradigm required a
rejection of ―rugged individualism‖ as ―the primacy of the whole is
emphasized,‖64 and, especially in the early years of independence,
African leaders often justified suppression of individual rights
with reference to the collective imperative of economic
development.65
Poverty has been at least as significant an obstacle as politics to
enforcement of basic human rights in Zambia. Zambia remains
one of the world‘s poorest countries, with a life expectancy of
forty-five years,66 sixty-four percent of the population below the
poverty line,67 and one of the highest unemployment rates in the

the new constitutions, [that] ‗offered African elites real power and the
bureaucratic machinery with which to exercise it effectively.‘‖ Id. at 1266 (quoting
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an
African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 71 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993)).
62 See Chuma Himonga, State and Individual Perspectives of a Mixed Legal
System in Southern African Contexts with Special Reference to Personal Law, 25 TUL.
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 23, 29 (2010); Jeanne M. Woods, Rights as Slogans: A Theory of
Human Rights Based on African Humanism, 17 NAT‘L BLACK L.J. 52, 55–57 (2003).
63 See Woods, supra note 62, at 56 (relaying President Kaunda‘s description of
tribal community as a mutual society that is organized to satisfy all of its
members‘ basic human needs).
64 Id.
65 As described by H. Kwasi Prempeh, the ideology of development came to
be a wholesale justification for the continuation of the authoritarian aspects of
colonial regimes and the subversion of rights-based constitutionalism. Prempeh,
supra note 61, at 1266–68. Writing in 1974, B.O. Nwabueze discussed how the
development rationale had been used to suppress individual rights and freedoms
and to diminish judicial power, while enhancing the authority of political leaders.
NWABUEZE, supra note 54, at 354.
66 Data by Country: Zambia, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org
/country/zambia (last visited Feb. 13, 2012) (providing data regarding life
expectancy in Zambia as of 2006).
67 The
World Factbook: Zambia, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html
(last updated Nov. 10, 2011) (providing the percent of Zambian citizens below the
poverty in 2006).
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world.68 Africa‘s AIDS pandemic compounds Zambian poverty,
and over fourteen percent of the Zambian population is currently
HIV positive.69 As a consequence of Zambia‘s poverty, widespread
government corruption continues to plague the country. Low
salaries have exacerbated this problem amongst the country‘s
police force, which has been known to require bribes to commence
investigations, to extort money from victims of crimes, and to
accept bribes from suspects in exchange for their release from
custody.70
Similarly, judicial corruption has inhibited the
development of a truly independent judiciary.71 Moreover, the
lack of adequate judicial resources, including insufficient numbers
of trained personnel, has contributed to prolonged pre-trial
detentions, with some defendants waiting for years for trials.72
Adding to this problem, prison officials regularly alter documents
to suggest prisoners have had court hearings when they have not,
often because the prisons lack the money to buy fuel to transport
prisoners to court.73
Meanwhile, human rights abuses by Zambian law enforcement
are common. Police frequently torture people in custody to coerce
confessions, and reports of recent abuses have included beatings
with metal bars and electrified rods and the hanging of prisoners
upside down to torture them.74 Additionally, police have, on
occasion, demanded sex from female detainees in exchange for
their release and have raped female prisoners.75 The police officers

68 See id. (ranking Zambia number 142 out of 199 in a list of countries
arranged from the lowest to the highest unemployment rate).
69 Background Note: Zambia, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov
/r/pa/ei/bgn/2359.htm (last updated Oct. 17, 2011).
70 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
Zambia (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld
/publisher,USDOS,,ZMB,4b9e52a8c,0.html [hereinafter Zambia 2009] (discussing
Zambia‘s human rights record).
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See Zambia: Police Brutality, Torture Rife, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 7,
2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/03/zambia-police-brutality-torturerife (arguing that these incidents should be investigated and that the perpetrators
should be held accountable).
75 Id.; see, e.g., Moses Kuwema, Sichilima Warns Policemen Sleeping with
Detainees, THE POST, Nov. 15, 2010, http://www.postzambia.com/postread_article.php?articleId=15684 (noting the reports of police officers demanding
intercourse from females arrested for loitering).
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who have committed these crimes have done so largely with
impunity.76
Overall, conditions for those in prison in Zambia are
horrendous. Prison buildings house several times the number of
inmates they were built to hold, and cells are often so crowded that
lack of floor space forces prisoners to sleep in shifts.77 This
overcrowding is largely attributable to the high percentage of
remand prisoners awaiting trial without bail, and similar
overcrowding plagues prisons across the continent, often because
remand prisoners who cannot afford to pay sureties to secure pretrial release end up waiting for years before their trials begin.78 In
Zambia, inmates in solitary confinement are regularly stripped
naked and placed in windowless cells filled up to their calves with
water contaminated with their own feces.79 Understaffing at the
prisons leads guards to delegate authority to prisoners, designated
as ―cell captains,‖ who enforce their own crude justice on the
population of inmates.80 Outbreaks of tuberculosis turn the prison
complexes into literal death traps.81 These sorts of devastating
prison conditions are common in many other African countries as
well.82
Given threats to the independence of the judiciary, a history of
human rights abuses, and devastating resource scarcity, access to
qualified lawyers is crucially important to Zambians dealing with
Zambia 2009, supra note 70.
See Celia W. Dugger, Report Calls Zambia’s Prisons ‘Death Traps,’ N.Y. TIMES,
Apr.
27,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/africa
/28zambia.html.
78 See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 8–10 (describing similar conditions in Benin,
Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, and Nigeria).
79 Dugger, supra note 77; Zambia: Police Brutality, Torture Rife, supra note 74
(providing selected accounts from Zambian prisoners about treatment they
experienced in police custody).
80 Dugger, supra note 77.
81 Id.
82 In 1996, representatives from forty African countries and seven other
countries promulgated the Kampala Declaration, recognizing widespread
inhumane conditions in African prisons, largely as a result of overcrowding.
PENAL REFORM INT‘L, Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa and
Plan
of
Action,
Sept.
19–Sept.
21,
1996,
available
at
http://www.penalreform.org/files/rep-1996-kampala-declaration-en.pdf; see also
Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in
Africa, pmbl. (Nov. 22–24, 2004), available at http://www.penalreform.org
/files/rep-2004-lilongwe-declaration-en.pdf (identifying the poor conditions of
prisons in African nations).
76
77
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legal conflict, and especially to those engaged in adversarial
proceedings against the government. Yet, as discussed throughout
this Article, most Zambians do not have meaningful access to legal
representation, and the vast majority of criminal defendants in
Zambia do not have lawyers. With only one lawyer for every
18,000 people in Zambia, it would be impossible, under the best of
circumstances, to provide for the country‘s legal needs. In the
United States, there is about one lawyer for every 260 people,83 and
in many countries in Europe, the ratios are similarly high.84
Throughout Africa, however, the numbers of practicing lawyers
are strikingly low. Table 1, on the following page, illustrates the
problem.
This is not to suggest that African countries necessarily require
lawyers in numbers proportionate to the world‘s most developed
economies. Yet the numbers across Africa are clearly insufficient.
As in Zambia, lawyers in most sub-Saharan countries concentrate
heavily in urban centers, leaving large portions of the population
with geographical, as well as financial, barriers to legal
representation.85 Moreover, even in urban areas, many criminal
defendants do not have lawyers,86 and most people with civil
claims cannot afford the costs of representation or litigation.87
Increasing the size of the African bar would help to address these
problems.

83 According to the American Bar Association, there were 1,180,386 active
lawyers in the United States in 2009. Total National Lawyer Counts 1878–2011, ABA
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/Pub
licDocuments/total_national_lawyer_counts_18782011_1.xls (last visited Feb. 14,
2012). In the same year, the population of the United States was approximately
305,500,000. See U.S. Population, 2009: 305 Million and Counting, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 31, 2008 http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles
/2008/12/31/us-population-2009-305-million-and-counting.
84 See COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUR., Number of Lawyers in CCBE
Member Bars, available
at http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload
/NTCdocument/table_number_lawyers1_1179905628.pdf (last updated in 2006)
(breaking down the demographics of lawyers who are members of a bar or
registered).
85 See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 13 (discussing barriers to legal
representation in sub-Saharan Africa).
86 Id.
87 See African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, Dakar
Declaration and Recommendations, §9 (1999), http://www.chr.up.ac.za
/index.php/documents-by-theme/fair-trial.html (stating that governments
should provide legal assistance to indigent persons to make the right of a fair trial
more effective).
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TABLE 1
Country
Botswana88
Cameroon89
Democratic
Republic of
Congo90
Ethiopia91
The Gambia
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi98
Niger99
88

12.

Number of
Lawyers
190
1,248

Population
1,600,000
17,000,000

Ratio of Lawyers
to People
1:8,421
1:13,622

3,000

60,000,000

1:20,000

434
13092
2,50094
7,00096
350
77

67,000,000
1,705,21293
23,837,26195
39,802,01597
12,000,000
11,000,000

1:154,378
1:13,117
1:9,535
1:5,686
1:34,286
1:142,857

The figures in this row were current as of 2007. Stapleton, supra note 36, at

Id.
Id.
91 Id.
92 GAMBIA BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.accessgambia.com/extra/gambiabar-association.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). However, 40 to 50 of these
lawyers are working outside of Gambia. Id.
93 Data by Country: Gambia, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org/web
/20101202092922/http://data.worldbank.org//country//gambia (last visited
Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive) (archival
copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law).
89
90

Training of Ghanaian Lawyers, GHANA BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://www.ghanabar.org/about-us/training-ghanaian-lawyers.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2012).
95
Data
by
Country:
Ghana,
WORLD
BANK,
http://web.archive.org/web/20101202154035/http://data.worldbank.org//cou
ntry//ghana (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on
Internet Archive) (archival copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Law).
96 See
Members
Overview,
THE
LAW
SOCIETY
OF
KENYA,
http://web.archive.org/web/20101019040643/http://www.lsk.or.ke/aboutlsk/overview/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on
Internet Archive) (archival copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Law).
97
Data by Country: Kenya, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org/web
/20101202154852/http://data.worldbank.org//country//kenya (last visited Feb.
14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive) (archival copy
on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law).
98 Stapleton, supra note 36, at 12.
94
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
Country
Nigeria
Rwanda102
Senegal103
Sudan104
Tanzania
Uganda

Number of
Lawyers
55,000100
420
300
2,000
1,188105
1,200107

Population
154,728,892101
8,000,000
10,000,000
33,000,000
43,739,051106
32,709,865108

Ratio of Lawyers
to People
1:2,813
1:19,048
1:33,333
1:16,500
1:36,834
1:27,258

In Zambia, the growth of the legal profession has been
distressingly slow. Between 2005, the first year for which the Law
Association of Zambia has existing records, and December of 2010,
the private bar in Zambia increased by only 153 lawyers, from 578

Id.
About NBA, NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://web.archive.org/web
/20100904024624/http://www.nigerianbar.org/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=1&Itemid=6 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching
internet url on Internet Archive) (archival copy on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law).
101 Data by Country: Nigeria, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org/web
/20101202160324/http://data.worldbank.org//country//nigeria (last visited
Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive) (archival
copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law).
102 Stapleton, supra note 36, at 12.
103 Id.
104 Id.
99

100

See Roll of Advocates, TANGANYIKA LAW SOCIETY, http://www.tls.or.tz
/pdf/rolls.pdf (showing the names and dates of admission of advocates into the
Society).
106 Data
by Country—Tanzania, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org
/web/20101202161926/http://data.worldbank.org//country//tanzania
(last
visited Feb. 11, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive)
(archival copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Law).
107 See UGANDA LAW SOCIETY, ANNUAL REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS 2010 10 (2010)
available
at
http://www.uls.or.ug/uploads/ULS%20ANNUAL%20REPORT
%202009-2010.pdf (stating the number of paid members of the Uganda Law
Society who are registered lawyers).
108 Data by Country—Uganda, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org/web
/20101202162306/http://data.worldbank.org//country//uganda (last visited
Feb. 11, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive) (archival
copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law).
105
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to 731.109 Yet in that same period, UNZA‘s school of law has
graduated between eighty and one hundred students per year.110
High failure rates at ZIALE largely account for this disparity.
Compounding the detrimental effects of the scarcity of
Zambian lawyers, the Legal Practitioners Act prevents many
people who might otherwise be able to obtain civil legal services
from doing so by prohibiting the use of contingency fees.111
Without that possibility, and with many Zambian lawyers
charging hundreds of dollars an hour, their services are
unattainable for the great majority of Zambians. Furthermore,
with only twenty-four lawyers at the Legal Aid Board and tens of
thousands of new criminal cases entered in magistrates‘ courts
each year, the plight of Zambian criminal defendants is dire. In a
promising development, 131 private practitioners have signed up
with the Law Association of Zambia‘s Legal Aid Committee to
participate in a program to take referrals of High Court criminal
cases from the Legal Aid Board.112 Nonetheless, this program
began operating only in mid-2010, and it is still too early to
determine the extent of its impact.113
Meanwhile, only a small handful of private, non-profit
organizations offer direct in-court legal representation.114 Two of
109 Figures available at the Law Association of Zambia offices, viewed on
December 6, 2010.
110 Interview with Anne Chanda, Acting Dean of the University of Zambia
School of Law, in Lusaka, Zambia (Sept. 28, 2010) (on file with author).
111 See Legal Practitioners Act, The Legal Practitioners’ Practice Rules, §8 (2002),
available at http://www.laz.org.zm/legal_prac_act.htm (stating that a practitioner
retained to prosecute or defend an action cannot arrange to receive a contingency
fee for that proceeding).
112 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7.
113 Id.; Interview with Likando Kalaluka, Convener of the Law Association of
Zambia Legal Aid Committee, in Lusaka, Zambia (Sept. 21, 2010) (on file with
author).
114 See generally Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of
Law, & Danish Institute for Human Rights, Mapping of Legal Aid Service
Providers in Zambia (Feb. 6, 2008) (unpublished report, on file with author).
Much of the material in Section 6 below is based on information gathered during
an exercise to map legal aid services in Zambia, conducted in late 2007 by the
University of Zambia School of Law, the Paralegal Alliance Network, and the
Danish Institute for Human Rights. As a lecturer at the University of Zambia
School of Law in 2007, I participated in the mapping exercise by facilitating
interviews and survey distribution in Northwestern Province and Copperbelt
Province. The project was funded by Deutsch Gesellschaft fur Technische
Zusammenarbeit (the German government‘s international development
program), the Royal Danish Embassy to Zambia, and the Royal Swedish Embassy
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those, the Legal Resources Foundation and the National Legal Aid
Clinic for Women, have largely ceased their operations as donor
fatigue has led to funding crises.115 A third, the International
Justice Mission, provides civil assistance, primarily in land
grabbing cases.116 A number of organizations use paralegals,
usually retained as volunteers, to conduct sensitization programs
to educate communities on their rights and to offer particularized
legal advice to individual clients. Nonetheless, these organizations
lack adequate funding for human or material resources, and most
paralegals have no supervision from lawyers.117
Despite these limitations, there is much potential for progress.
While some of the problems with the country‘s justice system are
intractably linked to Zambia‘s extreme dearth of resources, Zambia
could provide better access to legal representation through a series
of achievable policy reforms. In the next section, I will examine in
detail the operations of Zambia‘s westernized courts, with a focus
on the adequacy of legal representation for criminal defendants.
Defendants in these courts receive some assistance from legal aid
lawyers and from the private bar. Nonetheless, most are not
represented, and the consequences are dire.
3.

ZAMBIA‘S WESTERN COURT SYSTEM

Though the High Court automatically refers unrepresented
criminal defendants to the Legal Aid Board, subordinate courts,
presided over by magistrates, oversee most criminal cases in
Zambia, and the great majority of defendants in those cases go
unrepresented. And while magistrates‘ courts regularly sentence
defendants to years in prison with hard labor, indigent criminal
defendants have no definitive right to a lawyer in those courts. As
a result, the Legal Aid Board often has to make difficult decisions
about which applications from subordinate court defendants it can
accept.118
The Board makes those decisions based on a
to Zambia. The project led to the compilation of a final report, completed in
February 2008, cited above.
115 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7.
116 Id.
117 Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of Law, &
Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 30.
118 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3 (―With subordinate court
cases, that is where we have to decide which cases really, really need to be placed
with us.‖).
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combination of the defendant‘s financial need and the complexity
and seriousness of the case.119 Furthermore, most defendants in
magistrates‘ courts are likely unaware that applying for legal aid is
even an option, and magistrates and prosecutors rarely advise
defendants to seek counsel or to apply for legal aid.120 Asked what
he would do with unlimited resources, Mr. Ngulube, the Acting
Director of the Legal Aid Board, said, ―If I had the choice, I would
put more lawyers in Subordinate Court.‖121
Statistics available from the High Court‘s central registry and
from the Legal Aid Board reveal the severity of the problem. In
2009, magistrates‘ courts in Zambia took pleas in more than 23,697
new criminal cases.122 Meanwhile, available data on new criminal
cases, including appeals, in the High Court show that the Court
dealt with only a small fraction of the criminal caseload of the
magistrates‘ courts in the same year.123 The recent commencement
of operations of the Law Association of Zambia‘s Legal Aid
Committee may significantly ease the Legal Aid Board‘s burden
with regard to High Court cases. In fact, 131 private practitioners,
close to a fifth of Zambia‘s private bar, have signed up to
participate in the program.124 Participating lawyers will earn about
$900 from a government-sponsored legal aid fund for each case
they handle through the Committee. While it is still too early to
determine the impact of the Committee, and while the payment
structure may encourage speedy disposition of cases rather than
high-quality representation,125 this LAZ initiative could
Id.
Id.; see also Interview with Alice Sitali, in Lusaka, Zambia (Sept. 20, 2010)
(on file with author) (―You‘ll find that the prosecutor is sometimes acting as
prosecutor and also counseling the defendants, but just advising the defendant to
plead guilty.‖).
121 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3.
122 Data collected from the High Court registry on Oct. 27 and Oct. 28, 2010.
The registry had data for eight of Zambia‘s nine provinces. However, there was
no information available for Southern Province. Additionally, statistics were
missing for the Mumbwa Subordinate Court in Central Province.
123 The High Court registry revealed a total of 1137 new cases in the High
Court, including appeals from subordinate courts, in 2009. This information also
did not include any cases from Southern Province.
124 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7.
125 Lawyers who accept cases through the Legal Aid Committee receive 2
million kwacha upon initiating representation and another 2 million kwacha once
the case is complete. This secondary payment, which does not depend on the
outcome of the case, may provide lawyers with incentives to dispense with cases
quickly rather than to represent clients to the best of their abilities.
119
120
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significantly improve the quality of representation of criminal
defendants in the High Court.
Even so, the Legal Aid Committee takes only High Court
cases,126 and, with only twenty-four lawyers, the overworked and
understaffed Legal Aid Board cannot possibly expect to effectively
represent the huge numbers of criminal defendants facing charges
each year in magistrates‘ courts. In fact, the Legal Aid Board‘s
various offices took, at most, 302 criminal cases from magistrates‘
courts in 2009.127 Overall, the Board took between 2492 and 2678
cases in 2009, including all civil and criminal cases in all courts,
and any assistance the Legal Aid Committee offers to lighten this
load will be insufficient to provide for the possibility of
representation for the majority of people facing criminal charges
across the country, especially in magistrates‘ courts.128
Yet it is clear that defendants confronting charges in Zambian
magistrates‘ courts face critical threats to their most fundamental
rights. An examination of case data from Lusaka District is
revealing. First, scrutiny of the plea books for six of fourteen
magistrates in the district for the first six months of 2009 provided
information on 765 cases.129 Of those, 558 cases had reached their
Interview with Likando Kalaluka, supra note 113.
The Legal Aid Board‘s central registry indicates that the Board accepted a
total of 246 criminal cases in magistrates‘ courts for all the Board‘s offices other
than Mansa in 2009. The Ndola office took seven criminal cases from magistrates‘
courts, the Kitwe office accepted forty-nine, the Lusaka office accepted eightynine; the Livingstone office accepted forty-two; the Chipata office accepted fifteen;
the Solwezi office took forty-one; and the Kabwe office accepted three. Records
from Mansa show that the office received applications for representation in fiftysix criminal cases in magistrates‘ courts in 2009, but the records do not show how
many of those cases the Mansa office accepted.
128 The Legal Aid Board‘s central registry shows the Ndola office accepted
173 criminal cases from all courts in 2009 and 26 civil cases; the Kitwe office
accepted 259 criminal cases and 88 civil cases; the Lusaka office accepted 834
criminal cases and 86 civil cases; the Livingstone office accepted 290 criminal cases
and 37 civil cases; the Chipata office accepted 288 criminal cases and 34 civil cases;
the Solwezi office accepted 123 criminal cases and 38 civil cases; the Kabwe office
accepted 160 criminal cases and 6 civil cases; Mansa received 175 applications for
criminal representation and eleven applications for civil representation, but the
records do not reveal how many of those cases the Mansa office accepted.
129 This included 80 cases before the Honorable A.M. Chulu; 243 cases before
the Honorable Hamaundu; 120 cases before the Honorable W. Banda; 150 cases
before the Honorable K. Mulife; 72 cases before the Honorable M. Makalile; and
100 cases before the Honorable Chilembo. Plea books for the remaining eight
magistrates in the district were either filled in sporadically, making it impossible
to rely on the data, or were unavailable after repeated attempts to access them
through marshals employed to assist the magistrates and to keep records.
126
127
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conclusion in magistrates‘ courts by late September 2010.130 In 290
of those 558 cases, defendants received prison sentences or were
sent to juvenile detention centers,131 and 241 of the cases involved
sentences of prison time with hard labor.132 One hundred twentyfour of the cases included sentences of one year or more of prison
time.133
Assessment of active case files is also revealing. Examination
in late September 2010 of the active files for ten of the fourteen
magistrates in Lusaka district, including 717 cases, shows that
defendants took their initial pleas in eighty-five percent of these
cases in 2009 or 2010. Nonetheless, a significant minority of cases
have languished much longer. Approximately eight percent of
active cases for the ten magistrates began in 2007 or earlier, and
sixteen of the cases began at least five calendar years before the
date of inspection. Additionally, none of these data accounts for
remand prisoners who may have spent considerable periods of
time in prison before magistrates took their initial pleas.
Perhaps ironically, cases in magistrates‘ courts may take longer
for those defendants lucky enough to obtain the services of the
Legal Aid Board. Of the 302 magistrates‘ court criminal cases the
board accepted in 2009, only sixty-seven cases were complete by
the end of the year. In some districts, the figures were particularly
striking. For example, of the eighty-nine criminal cases the Legal
Aid Board accepted in 2009 from Lusaka District magistrates‘
courts, the government withdrew the charges in one case, and
none of the remaining eighty-eight cases were complete by the end
of 2009. This trend may, however, be unsurprising. Motions by

130 This figure included 46 of eighty cases begun in Honorable Chulu‘s court
in the first half of 2009; 214 of 243 cases in Honorable Hamaundu‘s court; 79 of 120
cases in Honorable Banda‘s court; 102 of 150 in Honorable Mulife‘s court; 50 of 72
in Honorable Makalile‘s court; and 67 of 100 cases in Honorable Chilembo‘s court.
131 This figure included 16 of the 46 cases completed in Honorable Chulu‘s
court; 115 of 214 in Honorable Hamaundu‘s court; 52 of 79 in Honorable Banda‘s
court; 56 of 102 in Honorable Mulife‘s court; 16 of 50 in Honorable Makalile‘s
court; and 35 of 67 in Honorable Chilembo‘s court.
132 This figure included 12 of the 46 cases completed in Honorable Chulu‘s
court; 104 of 214 in Honorable Hamaundu‘s court; 37 of 79 in Honorable Banda‘s
court; 50 of 102 in Honorable Mulife‘s court; 10 of 50 in Honorable Makalile‘s
court; and 28 of 67 in Honorable Chilembo‘s court.
133 This figure included 10 of the 46 cases completed in Honorable Chulu‘s
court; 58 of 214 in Honorable Hamaundu‘s court; 4 of 79 in Honorable Banda‘s
court; 28 of 102 in Honorable Mulife‘s court; 6 of 50 in Honorable Makalile‘s court;
and 18 of 67 in Honorable Chilembo‘s court.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/3

03 KAHN-FOGEL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

SHORTAGE OF AFRICAN LAWYERS

5/9/2012 11:34 AM

745

represented clients may slow the procession of a case, and the
Legal Aid Board tends to accept cases in magistrates‘ courts only
for relatively serious and complex matters.134 In any case,
defendants who are able to attract the attention of the Legal Aid
Board are certainly better off with lawyers than without; the
average criminal defendant in Zambian courts has little education
and little concept of his legal rights or how to navigate the court
system. As significant as any other benefit a lawyer may confer,
lawyers may be more likely to be able to obtain bail than
unrepresented criminal defendants.
For those without lawyers, seeking bail can be difficult, for
magistrates have broad discretion to deny bail, even for nonviolent offenders and without any obligation to articulate reasons
for that denial.135 Ultimately, Likando Kalaluka, the Convener of
the Law Association‘s Legal Aid Committee, attributes the high
percentage of Zambian prisoners who have not had trials to this
unfettered discretion, in addition to the lack of legal representation
for most defendants in magistrates‘ courts.136 Such discretion is
particularly troubling in light of the lack of professional training of
most Zambian magistrates, over seventy percent of whom are not
qualified as lawyers.137 For now, in any case, defendants in
magistrates‘ courts are unlikely to be lucky enough to attract the
attention of the Legal Aid Board and unlikely to be able to afford
private representation. Any serious attempt to improve access to
justice in Zambia must include measures to reduce the number of
people sentenced to years of imprisonment without the benefit of
legal representation.
Zambians with civil claims are equally unlikely to be able to
afford lawyers. With high hourly rates as the general norm, most
Zambians have no choice but to act as their own advocates or to
forgo pursuing litigation as a means of enforcing their rights. A
significant minority of the Legal Aid Board‘s caseload is civil, and
Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3.
Interview with Likando Kalaluka, supra note 113.
136 Id. (―We should have it mandatory that anytime someone appears in court
on a bailable offense, the court should grant bail unless the state has a specific
reason why bail should not be granted.‖). But, citing the shortage of Zambian
lawyers, Mr. Kalaluka said that he does not believe it is currently feasible to
provide most criminal defendants with lawyers.
137 Zambia, 2009, supra note 70 (describing how at the end of 2009, only 41 of
150 Zambian magistrates were qualified as lawyers, and the rest were lay
magistrates).
134
135
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in 2009, the Board accepted between 365 and 376 civil cases across
the country,138 most of which involved disputes over land.139
Similarly, the International Justice Mission handles some land
claims for Zambians who cannot afford to hire their own
lawyers.140 However, these avenues for obtaining legal assistance
are available to only an extreme minority of Zambians with
credible civil claims. There is no reasonable prospect of that
changing while the country‘s prohibition on contingency fees
remains intact and without dramatic growth in the population of
Zambian lawyers. In Section 7 of this Article, I will suggest
potential measures to increase the availability of legal
representation, including strategies for growing the Zambian legal
profession and possibilities for improving the availability of legal
assistance given the current dearth of lawyers. In the next section
of the Article, I will examine the causes for the current paucity of
Zambian lawyers.
4.

CAUSES OF THE SCARCITY OF ZAMBIAN LAWYERS

With no Zambian lawyers at the time of independence, the task
of developing the country‘s legal profession would be daunting
under the best of circumstances. Almost overnight, Zambians
faced a transition from a system in which customary legal
principles governed almost all of their affairs to one in which
Western-style courts were intended to oversee most major disputes
both between individuals and between individuals and the state.
Because colonial policies had largely excluded native Africans
from engaging with British law and from accessing legal
education, the new nation would have to build its legal profession
from whole cloth. In 1964, as Zambia was establishing its new

138 See supra text accompanying note 128. In addition to Zambia, South Africa
provides legal aid in some civil cases. See also Brian Brophy, A Civil Right to
Counsel Through the States Using California’s Efficiency Project as a Model Toward a
Civil Gideon, 8 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 39, 41 (2011). The Lilongwe
Declaration, with input from delegates of twenty-one African countries, also
contemplates the use of civil legal aid. See PENAL REFORM INT‘L, supra note 82.
Additionally, the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights urges the
provision of civil legal aid in cases in which the ―interest of justice‖ requires it.
See African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, § H(a)–(b),
Doc/OS(XXX)247 (2001).
139 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3.
140 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7.
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legal order, the country had no university, let alone a law school,
and huge investments in educational infrastructure would be
necessary to begin the difficult work ahead. Close to fifty years
after independence, an analysis of obstacles to growth of the
Zambian legal profession must still include a heavy focus on legal
education.
In the first part of this section, I will discuss the state of the
Zambian legal academy. Resource limitations and poor policy
choices in that academy have hindered the admission of new
lawyers to the Zambian bar. Meanwhile, around ninety percent of
each new class at ZIALE has failed the bar admissions course in
recent years.141 Problems with the organization and administration
of ZIALE have also likely suppressed growth of the Zambian legal
profession. I will discuss these issues in the second part of this
section.
4.1. Legal Education in Zambia
4.1.1. State of the Zambian Legal Academy
As mentioned above, Zambia established its national
university, UNZA, in 1965 and the UNZA School of Law in 1967.
Until 2005, the School of Law remained the country‘s only law
school, and until late 2010, it was the only school in the country
from which ZIALE would accept candidates for the bar.142 Thus,
discussion of the Zambian legal academy necessarily entails a
heavy focus on the UNZA School of Law. Interviews with local
lawyers and with the Acting Dean of the School of Law revealed a
common belief that legal educators in Zambia have failed, at least
in some respects, to adequately prepare law students for entrance
into the profession.143 Deeper examination of the Zambian legal

Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
ZIALE refused to grant admission to students from Zambian universities
other than UNZA until the High Court ordered the Institute to do so. Although
the High Court ruled that ZIALE must begin admitting students from Zambia
Open University in mid-2009, students from Zambia‘s newer law schools did not
begin matriculating until September 2010. Id.; Zambia Open University Law
Students Win Major Legal Battle, TIMES ZAMBIA, July 2, 2009, at 4, available at
NewsBank, inc., Record No. TOZA72497950.
143 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. When asked about the
cause of high failure rates at ZIALE, Mr. Ngulube, Mrs. Sitali, and Mr. Kalaluka
each separately noted that they perceived a decline in the quality of legal
education in Zambia. See also Interview with Likando Kalaluka, supra note 113;
141
142
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academy confirms that popular conception.
Nonetheless,
staggering economic challenges have undeniably contributed to
and compounded the problem.
At the time of the founding of the UNZA School of Law in
1967, the University Senate set out broad and ambitious goals for
the new school. According to the law school‘s 1970 handbook, the
objectives of the school were to provide Zambia with lawyers with
skills at least equal to the best lawyers from abroad, but better
suited to the needs of a developing country like Zambia; to help
develop and build the legal system of the newly independent
country; and to make the school‘s staff and students generally
available to improve community welfare.144 Forty years later, the
school has fallen short of these lofty ideals.
The reasons for this failure are numerous, though much of the
problem is traceable to the unavailability of public resources for
tertiary education in Zambia. Specifically, the law school is
dramatically understaffed, faces chronic absenteeism from some
faculty members, and has a dire shortage of books and other
educational materials. Moreover, frequent strikes by University
faculty shut the school down, sometimes for weeks at a time.145
Although a lack of adequate funding inevitably makes efficient
operation a struggle, the School might resolve some of its problems
through pedagogical innovation and policy reforms to enhance the
impact of the School‘s faculty.
Perhaps the most serious problem the University of Zambia‘s
law school faces is a faculty shortage. While the School has an
official establishment of twenty-five full-time faculty members,
including two professors and twenty-three lecturers, there are
currently only nine full-time teachers on the faculty, including
eight lecturers and one professor.146 Meanwhile, 371 students were
enrolled at the school in the fall of 2010, and in some semesters
there are over 400 students.147

Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3; Interview with Alice Sitali, supra
note 120.
144 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 491 (citing Univ. of
Zambia, Law School Handbook 1 (1970)).
145 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, Lecturer, University of Zambia School of
Law, in Lusaka, Zambia (Oct. 28, 2010) (on file with author).
146 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
147 Id.
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Operating with less than half the establishment of law teachers
would present significant difficulties even if all members of the
faculty were fully engaged with their responsibilities to the School.
However, according to Anne Chanda, Acting Dean of the
University of Zambia School of Law, this has not been the case.
Law teachers skipping their own classes has become a chronic
problem at the school, and some faculty members miss large
percentages of their assigned classes each semester, frequently
without giving advance notice to students.148 In general, according
to Chanda, faculty who spend little time at school are usually
devoting their working hours to private practice.149
The lack of sufficient numbers of law faculty at UNZA and the
unavailability of those who are on the faculty are problems that
have not been lost on UNZA‘s law students. A survey of seventyfour of ninety-five full-time students in their second-to-last-year of
law school was revealing. In response to an open-ended survey
question about the biggest problems at the School, over one-third
of students mentioned unavailability of faculty, often specifically
citing faculty skipping their classes and office hours.150 Twentyeight percent cited insufficient numbers of faculty as a concern.151
The shortage of full-time faculty and the rampant absenteeism of
theoretically full-time teachers may have contributed to low
morale amongst students and to a souring of relations between
students and their teachers. Forty-five percent of the students
surveyed mentioned intimidation by faculty or overt disrespect for
students as one of the School‘s most serious problems.152
In part, these problems are a result of simple economic reality.
While it is common for faculty at the School to earn little more than
Id.
Id.
150 I distributed survey questions to all students present in a Human Rights
class, in which the entire third-year class of full-time students was enrolled.
Seventy-four of ninety-five students were present in class, and 100% of those
present responded to the survey. The question on institutional challenges read as
follows: ―What are the most significant problems at your law school? Please
provide as much detail as possible in the space below.‖ Twenty-six of the
seventy-four students mentioned unavailability of faculty as a problem at the
school. Survey of Third-Year Law Students at the University of Zambia School of
Law, in Lusaka, Zambia (October 7, 2010) (on file with author).
151 Twenty-one of seventy-four students mentioned an insufficient number of
faculty members as a problem. Id.
152 Thirty-three
of seventy-four students mentioned disrespect and
intimidation of students by faculty as a problem. Id.
148
149
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$1000 a month from the University, private consulting jobs and
private law practice in Zambia can be much more lucrative, and
some local law firms charge hundreds of dollars an hour for their
services.153 Similar problems afflict the law faculties of other
African countries, where law teachers often earn as little as $400 to
$600 a month from their law schools but have corporations and law
firms competing for their time and willing to remunerate them
generously.154 Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that
some members of African law faculties feel compelled to devote
most of their time to private practice, even if doing so means
shirking law school responsibilities.
The disparity between private-sector income for qualified
lawyers and salaries for members of the law faculty also makes
recruiting qualified new faculty difficult, and, again, the problem is
common throughout much of the continent.155 Those who do join
African law faculties often stay for only a few years, and the high
turnover rate prevents schools from maintaining a focused,
coherent sense of direction.156 This has certainly been the case at
UNZA.157 Related to and compounding the problem of low
salaries for African law teachers, the profession has failed to garner
the prestige associated with law teaching in the West, and the best
African legal minds often feel they can have greater impacts in the
private sector or in civil service positions.158
153 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110; Interview with Misozi
Lwatula, supra note 145.
154 See Thomas F. Geraghty & Emmanuel K. Quansah, African Legal Education:
A Missed Opportunity and Suggestions for Change: A Call for Renewed Attention to a
Neglected Means of Securing Human Rights and Legal Predictability, 5 LOY. U. CHI.
INT‘L L. REV. 87, 98–99 (2007) (emphasizing that the huge disparity between faculty
salaries and those of private sector lawyers and consultants makes it extremely
difficult for faculty to teach full-time).
155 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 501 (indicating that
impoverished law schools face difficulties in recruiting and retaining law teachers,
which in turn has affected the quality of legal education in Africa).
156 See id. at 502 (noting that, as bright young law teachers have little
incentive to teach in the long term, African law schools lack the ―driving core‖
that accompanies stability in faculty and resources). At the University of Zambia
School of Law, five people who had been full-time faculty members in mid-2006
were no longer on the faculty by the end of 2010, representing over half of the fulltime faculty at the law school at the later date. Interview with Anne Chanda,
supra note 110.
157 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
158 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 71–72 (listing shrinking university
resources and inadequate faculty salaries as the primary reasons that teaching law
in Africa is no longer deemed a desirable career path).
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The economic incentives driving the best legal minds away
from teaching and pulling those who are willing to teach away
from their academic duties help to perpetuate a self-reinforcing
cycle.
As members of the law faculty abandon their
responsibilities to students, the quality of education declines, and
graduates of local law schools are less prepared than they should
be as they matriculate into the bar admission course at ZIALE.
Low pass rates at ZIALE limit the size of the community of
lawyers, thus keeping legal fees high and ensuring the
continuation of the incentives that limit the size and dedication of
Zambian law faculties.
Unfortunately, University policy has reinforced external
pressures on law school faculty to spread their time amongst
numerous endeavors. Like most other African universities,159
UNZA pays equal salaries to faculty of all disciplines. This policy
represents a failure to respond to the market for legal services that
draws high-quality lawyers away from academic careers. Instead
of raising the salaries of law teachers, however, UNZA chose a
compromise that ensures an absentee faculty. For the first twentyseven years of the School‘s operation, UNZA rules prohibited
faculty at the School of Law from practicing, but in 1994, the policy
changed, allowing lecturers and professors to open their own law
firms.160 Before that shift in policy, the School of Law had a truly
full-time faculty, but now it has become common for many ―fulltime‖ teachers at the School to spend weeks at a time away from
campus, even in the middle of the semester.161 Again, the problem
has been common throughout the continent, yet, according to at
least one estimate, schools that have tried to prohibit their faculties
from spending large amounts of time engaging in outside
consulting projects or in private practice have driven away their
best teachers.162
159 See Geraghty & Quansah, supra note 154, at 99 (discussing the ―peculiar‖
salary structure of African universities paying all professors the same regardless
of discipline).
160 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
161 ―When I was a student, we used to have truly full-time faculty members.
We used to have lecturers seated, waiting for us anytime. They were here the
whole time,‖ Mrs. Chanda said. Id.
162 See Dauphinais, supra note 13 at 72 (quoting Yash Ghai, Law, Development
and African Scholarship, 50 MOD. L. REV. 750, 774–75 (1987)) (―Some countries or
universities have tried to ban or regulate outside work, but this, if effective, drives
the best people out of teaching.‖).
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Dramatic growth in the student body has compounded the
effects of the shortage of faculty and unavailability of those who
are ostensibly full-time teachers. Until the mid-1990‘s, there were
never more than forty students in a class at UNZA‘s law school,
but those numbers have more than doubled since that time.163 This
growth has mirrored a similar enlargement of the student body of
the University but has not been accompanied by an increase in
material or human resources.164 Likewise, law schools throughout
Africa have faced pressure to admit more and more students in
recent years, often doubling their student bodies without
increasing the sizes of their faculties or of their libraries, which has
diminished the quality of African legal education.165
Ultimately, Acting Dean Chanda attributes much of the
problem to personal failures by some members of the faculty to
live up to their responsibilities. ―The problem of people not
attending classes and not marking on time has been seated with
certain individuals, year in and year out. It‘s a question of
commitment,‖ Chanda said.166 According to Chanda, for faculty
unwilling to teach their classes or attend office hours, ―it‘s immoral
to receive a salary . . . okay you can say it is too small, then leave it
and resign. . . . Commitment is cardinal. And as I sit here, I think
that people are just not committed. Or maybe they are tired. I
don‘t know.‖167
Discussing the school‘s most significant challenges, Mrs.
Chanda also noted the law faculty‘s failure to produce scholarship.
It is rare for faculty of the School of Law to publish at all, and even
less common for them to publish outside the School‘s own journal,
the Zambia Law Journal.168 This systemic failure to engage in
research and to produce scholarship has also contributed to the
School‘s failure to provide adequate pedagogy.169 Similarly,
incentives to supplement law teaching with other endeavors have
left law teachers in other African countries with little time for
Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
Id.
165 See Ndulo, supra note 10, at 497 (indicating that the pressure to increase
law school class sizes without the necessary resources to do so ―ha[s] adversely
affected the learning environment‖).
166 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
163
164
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academic writing.170 In some countries, government hostility to
faculty research efforts has inhibited scholarship.171 Chanda
summarized the current state of research at UNZA somberly.
―Research is very minimal. It‘s the pillar of teaching, but very little
is happening,‖ she said.172
Finally, Mrs. Chanda expressed a belief that despite fairly
consistent high admissions standards throughout the School‘s
history, the quality and attitudes of matriculating students have
declined over time, in part due to failures in the country‘s primary
and secondary education systems.173 ―It‘s like we are not getting
the cream anymore. This problem is not starting from UNZA. It‘s
starting from the primary school. But there is a problem in the
education system. Even simple sentence construction, nowadays, a
fourth year university student, they write sentences that make you
think, which school did you go to?‖ Chanda said. And Dean
Chanda believes the problem is partly an issue of attitude. ―They
want things given to them. They are not willing to read, they are
not willing to do their work,‖ she said of UNZA‘s law students.174

170 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 98 (noting that African law teachers are
overextended and must engage in outside employment to compensate for low
teaching salaries).
171 See id. at 100 (citing evidence that government authorities play a role in
impeding the improvement and reform of African legal education).
172 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
173 Mrs. Chanda noted that UNZA central administration‘s shift, several
years ago, to a quota system by which it holds a fixed number of spaces at the
School of Law open for students from Humanities, rather than using a strict cutoff
based on first-year marks in Humanities, may have slightly reduced the quality of
students, but students matriculating at the School of Law now have relatively
similar marks in their first year at the University to students from previous
decades. Id.
174 Id. Despite Mrs. Chanda‘s statement that UNZA‘s admissions standards
have remained essentially constant, the opinion is common amongst Zambian
lawyers that standards at UNZA have declined. ―Nowadays, students are all
driving cars. They are all accountants, HR managers. They are in full
employment. Generally, the strict requirements for getting into law school have
been compromised at UNZA. Now, all those with money, you want to do law,
you go law school.‖ Interview with Likando Kalaluka, supra note 113. Mr.
Ngulube expressed similar sentiments. ―I think the standards have gone down,‖
he said. ―And this is evident in the skill that you notice in the lawyers when they
finally come to practice. They are not as sharp as the lawyers that left in the early
90s and mid-90s . . . some of the people that are doing law would have been better
off doing something else.‖ Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3;
Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
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At least part of the Zambian legal academy‘s failure likely
results from pedagogical choices. Like most other former British
colonies in Africa, UNZA‘s School of Law adopted the British
approach to legal education as an undergraduate degree
program.175 Students who want to matriculate into the School of
Law spend their first year at UNZA in the School of Humanities
and Social Sciences and then study at the School of Law for an
additional three years.176 The structure of the law curriculum is
inherited from the British system and is similar to that in most
other common law countries. Students in their second year of legal
study take Legal Process, Law of Contract, Torts, Criminal Law,
and Constitutional Law.177 The third year, like the second, is
composed only of required courses including, Land Law,
Commercial Law, Family Law, Evidence, and Administrative
Law.178 In the final year of study, the school requires students to
take Jurisprudence and Company Law, and students are then free
to choose three electives.179 Students in their second year of legal
study participate in a moot court program, and, as in most other
African countries, students in their final year of study must write a
research paper under the supervision of a member of the faculty.180
At UNZA, as at most other law schools in common law Africa,
faculties have inherited their teaching styles from the British
tradition, but with greater stress on formalism.181 In most classes,
students do not study cases or learn through the Socratic
Method.182 Instead, most members of the faculty assign textbooks
and teach through the lecture method, generally supplemented by
separate tutorials in which students participate in the learning
process through exercises and presentations.183 Nonetheless, the
Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
Id.
177 UNIV. OF ZAMBIA SCHOOL OF LAW HANDBOOK 9 (2008) (on file with author).
178 Id. at 10.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 11.
181 See Stephen K. Huber, Legal Education in Anglo-Phonic Africa: With
Particular Attention to a Case Book and the Criminal Law, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 1188, 1190
(1969) (highlighting some of the challenges students face as a result of receiving a
formalistic education in a rapidly changing society); Ndulo, supra note 10, at 492
(detailing the focus of African legal education on the mere memorization, not
application, of legal standards and rules).
182 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, supra note 145.
183 Id.
175
176
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pedagogical approach tends toward the rote and mechanistic.184
Teachers generally do not focus on policy questions, and students
are expected to memorize large numbers of rules, studying the
holdings of major cases rather than the cases themselves or the
reasoning used to arrive at legal conclusions.185 The pedagogical
focus on rote memorization of rules likely inhibits students‘
development of the critical reasoning skills necessary to excel at
ZIALE and to be fully effective as practitioners, for practitioners
are unlikely to encounter the precise situations students learn in
the classroom, and even if they do, they are unlikely to remember
what they learned.
The gap between theory-based curricula and the more practiceoriented approach at ZIALE may also partially explain why law
graduates are unprepared for the rigors of the bar admissions
course.186 At UNZA, while a clinical program once gave some
students the chance to gain practical experience and knowledge,
the school closed its clinic in 2009 after it determined there was
insufficient oversight to provide students with meaningful
learning experiences.187 As discussed below, ZIALE‘s curriculum
has also developed into a largely academic enterprise, with
students attending lectures on subjects that often correspond with
law school courses. Even so, ZIALE does test students on a range
of practice-oriented knowledge, and the lack of clinical programs
at Zambia‘s law schools, along with the focus on academic
knowledge at those schools, may contribute to low pass rates at
ZIALE.
At UNZA, there may be some reason for optimism. In the last
year, the School of Law has begun to encourage lecturers to
experiment with the Socratic Method, and in some classes the
school has abandoned the use of tutorials as law faculty shift
toward a more interactive approach to teaching.188 Moreover,
184 See Ndulo, supra note 10, at 492–93 (emphasizing the need for a shift in
focus from rules-based thinking to critical thinking in the African legal education
system).
185 Id. at 493.
186 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110; Interview with Palan
Mulonda, supra note 31.
187 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
188 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, supra note 145.
School of Law Dean
Margaret Munalula distributed notes in mid-2010 declaring ―the teaching
methodology will from 2010 onwards change to the Socratic Method.‖ Dr.
Margaret Munalula, Teaching in the School of Law: Relevant Materials and Notes, 4
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despite the faculty‘s serious failure to produce scholarly literature,
the school initiated a book project five years ago, providing
financial incentives for faculty to write books with some focus on
local law.189 Since the beginning of the book project, members of
the faculty have produced casebooks on torts, contracts, and
criminal law, amongst others.190 While these books often contain
very little explanatory commentary, the focus on cases may
improve the educational experience of students. Moreover, the
inclusion of Zambian cases will make legal education more
relevant to Zambian students. Finally, local production of the
books, which UNZA Press publishes,191 may provide students with
easier access to required materials.
Nonetheless, a severe shortage of material resources at UNZA
hampers the educational experience and compounds the problem
of low salaries driving faculty toward outside jobs. In the survey
of full-time students in their second-to-last year, 82.4% of
respondents listed a lack of books or other learning materials as
one of the most serious problems at the law school, making this
problem the most commonly cited issue amongst the surveyed
students.192 In fact, it is incredibly difficult for most students at the
School of Law to access books for the School‘s required courses.
While new casebooks by local faculty may ease the dilemma,
historically the campus bookstore has carried very few of the books
required for law school classes, and it is expensive and logistically
difficult for students to get law books from abroad.193 Moreover,
the School‘s law library, a converted faculty office, is insufficiently
stocked and open to students only a few hours a week at most.194
As a result, large groups of students often share a single book, and
others go without.195
Until a few years ago, the University of Zambia, the country‘s
flagship public university, had the only law school in Zambia.

(June 15, 2010) (on file with author). The distributed notes also included a
Wikipedia article on the Socratic Method. Id. at 40.
189 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Survey of Third-Year Law Students at the University of Zambia School of
Law, supra note 150.
193 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, supra note 145.
194 Id.
195 Id.
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Since 2005, however, three new law schools have emerged in
Lusaka.196 Because none of Zambia‘s new law schools have had
any students gain admission to the bar yet, it is too early to assess
how effectively they are preparing students for practice. So far, in
any case, members of the legal community have tended to view
these new law schools as offering less rigorous, inferior programs
compared to UNZA.197
Some of the problems at Zambia‘s newer law schools
undoubtedly mirror those at the UNZA. For one thing, lecturers at
the fledgling institutions are often moonlighting faculty from
UNZA,198 already stretched too thin to devote full attention to their
teaching duties at the nation‘s first law school. Second, one of
these new schools, Zambia Open University, is a correspondence
program,199 which certainly compounds the challenges for students
hoping to get one-on-one attention from their teachers.
Pedagogical approaches at the other two law schools, Lusaka
University and Cavendish University, are similar to those at
UNZA.200 Moreover, while UNZA‘s law clinic has shut down at
least for the time being, none of the new law schools have offered
any clinical education programs at all.201 Finally, there seems to be
a consensus that Zambia‘s new law schools have lower admissions
requirements and, generally, lower caliber students than UNZA.202
Ultimately, the performance of the law graduates of Zambia‘s
newer law schools at ZIALE may provide some insight on the
quality of legal education at those institutions.
Despite the apparently widespread sentiment in Zambia‘s legal
community that the new law schools are inferior to UNZA, they
may, in time provide an important spur to pedagogical innovation
as they compete for students. Likewise, they may exert pressure
on each other‘s faculties to demonstrate greater devotion to their
196 These schools, which are all private, are Zambia
University, and Cavendish University. Id.
197 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110;
Kalaluka, supra note 113; Interview with Anderson
Interview with Alice Sitali, supra note 120.
198 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, supra note 145.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
202 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110;
Kalaluka, supra note 113; Interview with Anderson
Interview with Alice Sitali, supra note 120.
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academic responsibilities. While UNZA‘s public status might, to
some extent, insulate the School of Law from the effects of this
competition, it is unlikely to be completely immune to it.
Ultimately, despite the skepticism Zambian lawyers have shown
toward the newer schools, these institutions have the potential to
improve the Zambian legal community both by providing a larger
pool of new lawyers to the country and, through competitive
pressure, by raising the quality of Zambian legal education.
4.1.2. Reasons for Resource Scarcity: A Case of Malign Neglect
Overall, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that economic
factors are at the heart of the Zambian legal academy‘s
dysfunction. Of course, even under the best of circumstances,
Zambia‘s relative national poverty would limit the resources
available for both public and private education. Nonetheless,
external factors have likely added to the problem. First, while
African law schools benefitted greatly from early support by
Western donors, that support declined severely beginning a
generation ago.203 In the 1960s and 1970s, as African states gained
independence, Western nations contributed human and financial
resources to help build the continent‘s new law schools.204 This
influx of assistance derived largely from a prevalent philosophical
conviction that educating new lawyers was crucial to the social and
political development of Africa‘s new nations.205
Yet a
combination of factors led to an almost complete abandonment of
these early projects. As many African states descended into
political turmoil and one-party systems ruled by autocratic leaders,
national support for education in general and legal education in

203 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 79 (recounting the decline in American
legal assistance, and an overall decrease in Western assistance to the developing
world, which were both detrimental to the continuing developmental progress of
African law schools); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 493
(explaining that many British and American legal scholars have stopped teaching
in African countries due to the lack of economic stability, as well as the decline in
Western funding to support such teachers).
204 See Geraghty & Quansah, supra note 154, at 89-91 (describing the initial
commitment American law teachers had provided to legal educators in Africa as
part of the ―law and development‖ movement).
205 Id. (noting that the once prevailing notion that improved legal education
in Africa would further economic efficiency, equality, and justice, has disappeared
because of the declining support from external donors).
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particular declined.206 At the same time, a debate emerged
amongst Western legal academics as to whether the ―law and
development‖ philosophy that drove early support for building
African law schools modeled on Western academies was truly the
best way to meet the needs of African countries.207 Ultimately,
external support for African legal education dwindled to almost
nothing.208
This decline coincided with the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) imposing austerity measures that required
pronounced cuts in public spending as conditions of continued
loan agreements for governments in developing countries.209 Thus,
while educational spending retained its relative position as a
percentage of social spending, the overall decline in such
expenditures throughout Africa meant less money and fewer
resources for African law schools.210 In Zambia in particular, the
transition from Kenneth Kaunda‘s one-party state to the
restoration of multi-party democracy in 1991 also marked a rapid
shift toward economic liberalization and away from the highly
regulated, state-directed economy of Kaunda‘s regime.211 While
206 Id. (stating that since 1986, there has been no organized effort among
American legal educators to provide the same assistance they had provided in
previous decades).
207 Id. (claiming that ―the time is now ripe for such a reassessment and for the
development of new strategies‖ regarding legal education in Africa).
208 Id.
209 Id.; see Thomas A. Kelley, Exporting Western Law to the Developing World:
The Troubling Case of Niger, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 321, 327–28 (2007) (explaining
that the Washington Legal Consensus called for decreased social spending and
reallocation of resources to the private sector); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa,
supra note 10, at 496–97 (describing how in many African countries, funding for
education is being jeopardized by the failure of the government to maintain
budget allocations in the face of economic decline).
210 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 496–97 (noting that
this lack in funding is exacerbated because most law schools are state-funded
institutions).
211 See REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., OXFORD UNIV., Executive Summary, ZAMBIA:
DEREGULATION AND THE DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2000), available at http://raiduk.org/work/zambia.htm (summarizing the effects of economic deregulation on
fundamental economic and social rights in Zambia); REFUGEE STUDIES CTR.,
OXFORD UNIV., Education, ZAMBIA: DEREGULATION AND THE DENIAL OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
(2000),
available
at
http://www.raid-uk.org/docs/Zambia
/Privatisation_Rpt/S3_ii.pdf (stating that the MMD inherited an educational
system that was already in decline because of lack of investment during the 198590 economic downturn).
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Kaunda had nationalized a higher percentage of the country‘s
industry than almost any other country on the continent, the new
government adopted World Bank and IMF policies geared toward
deregulation, privatization, and rationalization of the public sector
employment system.212 At the same time, World Bank and IMF
austerity measures have resulted in a ―massive absolute reduction
in public spending‖ in Zambia.213 As a consequence, educational
spending declined sharply, both as a percentage of GDP and in real
terms.214 By 1996, average real spending in Zambia was only $50
per student, while it had been $118 in 1983.215
The decline in resources available for public education in
Zambia may account for a reduction in the quality of primary and
secondary education in the country and for the prevalent sense
that students matriculating into Zambian universities have lower
educational aptitude than their counterparts in the 1990s. In any
case, the dearth of resources is clearly evident at the UNZA School
of Law and certainly accounts, to a large extent, for the severe
human resources problems and for the insufficient availability of
educational material. Ultimately, these limitations have kept
academic salaries low, ensuring that members of Zambian law
faculties will have powerful incentives to seek outside work. A
corresponding scarcity of material resources, including
inadequately stocked law libraries, has prevented students from
gaining access to required reading materials for their classes. It
seems likely, moreover, that declining expenditures on primary
education have led to a decline in the quality of students entering
Zambian law schools, thus making the task of educating new
lawyers more difficult. Yet the conclusion is inescapable that the
Id.
See REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., OXFORD UNIV., Austerity and the Denial of Social
Rights, ZAMBIA: DEREGULATION AND THE DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO
THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 220 (2000), available at
http://raid-uk.org/docs/Zambia/Privatisation_Rpt/Sde_i.pdf (―However, in the
case of Zambia it is the catastrophic decline in overall levels of funding of the
social sectors in real terms which is the cause of most concern.‖). This problem
has been exacerbated by the austerity measures demanded by the Bank and IMF.
214 See
REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., OXFORD UNIV., Education, ZAMBIA:
DEREGULATION AND THE DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2000), available at http://www.raiduk.org/docs/Zambia/Privatisation_Rpt/S3_ii.pdf (noting that the lack of
resources available is the major contributor to failures in the African legal
education system).
215 Id. at Section 3.I.C.1, EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION.
212
213
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University of Zambia (and probably Zambia‘s newer law schools)
bears some of the responsibility for failing to adequately prepare
Zambian law students for entrance into the post-graduate baradmissions program; and, in the final analysis, failure rates at
ZIALE are a crucial cause of the limited number of lawyers in
Zambia.
4.2. Bar Admission: The Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal
Education
Earning a law degree is not the final challenge in the gauntlet
of obstacles an aspiring Zambian lawyer must face. As is typical in
common law countries in Africa, admission to the bar in Zambia
requires completion of a formal, post-graduate academic
curriculum after attaining an LLB;216 as mentioned above, ZIALE
currently authorizes and administers this curriculum in Zambia.
While ZIALE may help prepare would-be lawyers for the rigors of
practice, the Institute operates as a barrier to entry to the legal
profession that prevents many Zambian law graduates from
becoming lawyers. And though Zambia‘s resource-strapped
education system bears some of the responsibility for failure rates
at ZIALE, institutional problems at ZIALE itself likely contribute to
the crisis.
In general, the African post-graduate bar-admissions program,
often called a law practice institute, takes between a year and a
year-and-a-half to complete.217 Though originally intended as
practice labs, mimicking the atmosphere of law offices and with
few formal lectures, many of these institutes have developed into
something more akin to an extra year of law school, in which
institute faculty teach traditional law school subjects in a classroom
setting.218 In Zambia, after students finish their law degrees, they
spend ten months studying ten subjects at ZIALE.219 While some
of these subjects are practice-oriented, ZIALE staff teaches all of the
subjects in an academic, classroom setting through a traditional

216 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 49–94 (stating the
general educational requirements for practicing law in African countries).
217 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
218 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 494 (describing the
lack of practical experience in post-graduate institutes, due in large part to the
shortage of practitioners on staff).
219 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012

03 KAHN-FOGEL (DO NOT DELETE)

762

5/9/2012 11:34 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:3

lecture method.220 To gain clinical experience, ZIALE students
spend the first half of each day working in a law office or
governmental department, and they spend afternoons attending
lectures at ZIALE headquarters.221
ZIALE candidates take mid-term tests and final exams in each
subject, and in order to qualify as lawyers they must pass all ten
courses.222 If a ZIALE candidate passes all ten subjects, she is then
called to the bar and can begin practicing law immediately.223 If
she fails six or fewer exams, she may retake exams for only the
subjects she failed, and she may attempt to retake those exams a
maximum of two more times, after which the candidate must wait
five years before repeating the entire ten-subject course.224 If the
candidate fails seven or more exams, she must retake exams for all
ten courses, subject also to the five-year ban if she fails to pass all
ten subjects after a maximum of three total attempts.225
Tuition at ZIALE is 12 million Kwacha (about $2,500 USD in
the winter of 2011), which is more than twice the price of full
tuition for the final year of law school at UNZA.226 While
approximately 75 percent of UNZA students are on some level of
government scholarship,227 ZIALE does not provide scholarships to
any students.228 Despite the high price tag, some law firms sponsor
ZIALE students, and those without sponsorship from employers
sometimes find support from immediate or extended family
members.229 According to Palan Mulonda, ZIALE‘s director, there
are very few Zambian law graduates unable to attend ZIALE due
to financial constraints.230 Nonetheless, Mr. Mulonda noted that
until a recent shift in policy requiring ZIALE candidates to pay 75
220 ZIALE courses include professional conduct; bookkeeping/accounts;
conveyancing/legal drafting; probate; commercial transactions; company law;
civil procedure; domestic relations; criminal procedure; and evidence. Interview
with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 University of Zambia, Academic Office figures show the tuition for 4 th
year LLB students to be 2,983,500 kwacha per semester.
227 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
228 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
229 Id.
230 Id.
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percent of tuition up front, many candidates attended ZIALE on
credit, and outstanding debts to the institution go back a decade.231
The cost seems even more significant given the high failure rates at
the Institute.
Only a small fraction of law graduates who enroll at ZIALE
will pass the course on their first attempt, and for the past several
years, first-time takers have cleared ZIALE at rates hovering
between ten percent and twelve percent.232 Somewhat more
encouraging figures emerge on examination of longer-term
statistics. For example, 61.5% (360 out of 585) of the people who
enrolled at ZIALE between 2003 and 2009 gained admission to
practice by the fall of 2010.233 Even so, these figures indicate that a
large percentage of Zambian law graduates are unable to practice
law and unable to contribute to the country‘s legal needs.
ZIALE‘s low pass rates are attributable, in part, to the dramatic
resource limitations of the Zambian education system, from
primary through tertiary school. Nonetheless, ZIALE itself bears
some portion of the responsibility for high failure rates at the
Institute. First, although ZIALE‘s curriculum mimics that of a
typical law school, with teachers lecturing on academic subjects in
a classroom setting, lecturers at ZIALE tend to be practitioners
with little or no outside experience as educators.234 Second,
although ZIALE students spend weekday mornings in clinical
attachments, the organizations that host them often do not expose
students to the range of clinical experiences necessary to
supplement the academic portion of the program and to prepare
students for ZIALE exams.235
Finally, a lack of grading
transparency raises concerns about the integrity of the process.
Despite the original intention to organize Zambia‘s law practice
institute as a clinical laboratory, offering students the chance to
learn in a practice-oriented setting, the program at ZIALE currently
resembles a conventional law school curriculum far more than a
practitioner‘s office.236 This setup may be an imperfect mechanism
for preparing future lawyers for the profession. Perhaps more
importantly, however, the current format is intrinsically flawed in
231
232
233
234
235
236

Id.
Id.
Figures provided by ZIALE headquarters on November 9, 2010.
Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
Id.
Id.
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its schizophrenic mismatch of a faculty comprised almost entirely
of practitioners with a curriculum focused on academic pedagogy.
To be sure, ZIALE‘s faculty contains many of Zambia‘s most
illustrious lawyers, including a former attorney general, supreme
court judges, and some of the country‘s most respected and
Nonetheless, given the
experienced private practitioners.237
academic nature of ZIALE classes, these lawyers may not be
ideally suited to their roles at the Institute.
In Zambia, as in most common law countries, the legal
practitioner‘s degree is an undergraduate LLB, and aspiring legal
academics must obtain an LLM before they can teach.238 By
retaining a faculty composed almost entirely of practitioners,
however, ZIALE has accepted a cadre of law teachers without the
academic training generally required for such an enterprise. If
ZIALE were truly run as a clinical program, practitioners would
likely be the best people to administer it. Under the circumstances,
however, ZIALE‘s faculty is likely unprepared for its
responsibilities.
This problem may be compounded by the club-like nature of
ZIALE hiring. According to ZIALE Director Palan Mulonda,
ZIALE has traditionally been a ―closed-shop‖ when it comes to
choosing new instructors.239 The Institute has not advertised for
open positions, but, rather, current members of the faculty have
―head hunted,‖ recommending new teachers to their peers.240
Overall, the composition of the faculty has been fairly stagnant,
and many of the members of ZIALE‘s faculty have been teaching at
ZIALE and its predecessor, the Law Practice Institute, since the
1960s.241 As a consequence, teaching at ZIALE suffers. According
to current ZIALE students, several of the instructors simply read
lectures from prepared notes, and others forgo doctrinal teaching
for large portions of the class period to engage students in casual
discussions about current events.242 Ultimately, it may behoove
ZIALE to reconsider its curriculum, its hiring process, or both.

Id.
Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
239 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Interviews with four anonymous ZIALE students, in Lusaka, Zambia
(Nov. 28, 2010).
237
238
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A second problem at ZIALE is that, although students enrolled
in the program spend several hours a day in clinical pupilages,
attached to local firms or government departments, these
attachments often do not provide ZIALE candidates with sufficient
clinical experience to prepare them for their qualifying exams.243
ZIALE‘s pupilages are intended to supplement the academic
portion of the curriculum, and should be a crucial component of
each student‘s preparation for the bar. In theory, these pupilages
should expose students to a wide variety of practice areas, and, at
least historically, this would have been eminently feasible, with
Lusaka‘s small law firms engaged in general practice and handling
a broad array of cases.
Nonetheless, students attached to a government office were
always likely to work in only a limited area of practice. Moreover,
many Lusaka firms now specialize in only one or two fields.244
Today, it is common for these firms to use ZIALE students as work
horses on menial projects, providing little oversight or guidance to
help students develop as lawyers.245 As in Zambia, students at the
law practice institutes of other African countries undertake
apprenticeships in law firms, and they encounter a host of
problems similar to those faced by students in Zambia; the typical
African law firm is ―small and poorly organized,‖ and senior
lawyers generally have little time to assist with the training of
apprentices.246 This is certainly the case in Zambia, and, in the final
analysis, ZIALE students tend to receive insufficient guidance
during their apprenticeships and to work in only a small portion of
the fields covered in the ZIALE course. In the opinion of Mr.
Mulonda, ZIALE‘s director, this has ―far reaching consequences on
their performance‖ at ZIALE.247
Finally, a lack of transparency in ZIALE‘s grading process has
the potential to undermine the integrity of the system. Despite
ZIALE‘s failure rates, students who do not clear midterms or final
exams are not permitted to review their test papers.248 In the
opinion of Mr. Mulonda, such transparency is unnecessary and
Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
Id.
245 Id.
246 Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 494 (detailing the failure
of many law practice institutes to meet the expectations of their founders).
247 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
248 Id.
243
244
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would be counterproductive.249 First, Mr. Mulonda pointed out
that ZIALE assigns both a lecturer and an assessor for each subject,
and assessors go over the lecturers‘ grades to ensure reliability.250
Additionally, according to Mr. Mulonda, allowing students to
review exam papers would be an annoyance to ZIALE lecturers
that would deter high-quality instructors from teaching at the
Institute.251
Nonetheless, allowing students to review exam papers would
serve two important purposes. First, given that around 90 percent
of ZIALE candidates fail the course on their first attempt,
permitting exam review would be a highly useful learning
experience that could help unsuccessful candidates understand the
reasons for their failures and how to improve their performances.
Second, greater transparency would ensure the integrity of the
grading process, including both the good faith of the graders and
the accuracy of the results.
Ultimately, the lawyers who administer and teach at ZIALE
have financial incentives to keep the profession small. With only a
few hundred private practitioners in the country, many Zambian
law firms are able to charge hundreds of dollars an hour, fees that
equal or surpass those of lawyers in countries like the United
States and the United Kingdom, and that are vastly
disproportionate to incomes of other professionals in Zambia.
Simple rules of supply and demand ensure that smaller numbers
of lawyers will tend to keep fees higher, and an influx of new
talent into the profession would increase competition and lower
the price of legal services. This economic reality may have a
subconscious influence even on lecturers and assessors grading in
good faith. To some extent, that monopolistic impulse may have
influenced ZIALE‘s initial refusal to allow students from Zambia‘s
new law schools to matriculate at the Institute, a decision that
stood until students from those schools compelled ZIALE to accept
them by suing in the High Court.252 A transparent grading process
Id.
Id.
251 ―The exam scripts are the property of ZIALE. You would just be opening
an unnecessary Pandora‘s box. We believe we have serious quality assurance
with people of high integrity. We don‘t need to subject these people to
unnecessary scrutiny from litigious and vexatious students. It would be hard to
retain the high quality lecturers we have if we opened them up to that.‖ Id.
252 See Zambia Open University Law Students Win Major Legal Battle, supra note
142. Students at fledging law schools in Kenya and Ghana have won similar
249
250
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would provide an important check on the natural incentive of the
legal community in the final analysis, a professional guild to
keep competition to a minimum by restricting access to the
profession.
Likewise, allowing students to view their exams would create
an extra check on possible grading errors by ZIALE lecturers and
assessors. While it is likely that these professionals grade in good
faith, like the members of UNZA‘s faculty, they are extraordinarily
busy, stretched thin by multiple professional endeavors and
competing demands on their time. Students, who ultimately have
the strongest incentive to ensure the accuracy of their results, could
play a vital role in guaranteeing the dependability of the grading
process. If ZIALE‘s grading system is truly reliable, the Institute‘s
lecturers and assessors should have little concern about opening
that system to review.
A variety of causes have prevented the Zambian legal
profession from growing quickly enough to meet the country‘s
legal needs. The legacy of colonialism, including the suppression
of African education, is a primary factor. After independence, the
abrupt transition to a Western legal framework and the need for
sophisticated legal experts to navigate the complex, foreign
machinery of the new system left the country in an immediate and
continuing crisis. Since independence, the dearth of resources in
Zambia‘s education system, along with institutional policy at
UNZA and ZIALE, has suppressed the growth of the profession. I
will discuss possible ways to mitigate this crisis in Section 7 below.
5.

ALTERNATIVES TO FORMAL LEGAL REPRESENTATION: THE ROLE
OF CUSTOMARY LAW

Although the formal justice system processes private common
law claims and criminal prosecutions under the Zambian penal
code, customary law plays a more prominent role than any
Western legal tradition for a large portion of Zambia‘s population.
As discussed briefly above, Zambia‘s formal justice system remains
pluralistic, with statutorily authorized local courts administering
customary law, subject to review by courts using Western legal
principles. On appeal from a local court, Zambia‘s higher courts,

battles in recent years to gain admission to their countries‘ law practice institutes.
Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30.
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employing a standard adopted from British colonialists,253 will
overturn customary law only if it is ―repugnant to natural justice,
equity, or good conscience.‖254 Countries throughout Africa have
implemented similar norms for navigating pluralistic systems,
combining Western and indigenous legal principles.255 As is
common throughout the continent, people living in rural areas
tend to live almost entirely under the umbrella of customary law,
administered by traditional courts that operate without the
sanction of the formal justice system.256
Zambia‘s diverse range of customary law traditions is largely
beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, it is worth engaging
in a brief discussion of customary law in Zambia because the
application of that law provides an alternative to Western legal
processes in which lawyers are indispensible to the accurate
administration of justice and may mitigate, to some extent, the
problems associated with the critical shortage of Zambian lawyers.
The use of customary law often leads to violations of ostensibly
universal human rights deeply ingrained in the collective
consciousness of the Western world and enshrined in international
covenants and national laws.257 On the other hand, customary law
253 See Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 958 (citing J.L. Kanganja, Courts and
Judges in Zambia: The Evolution of the Modern Judicial System (1981)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London) (on file with the University of
London Library); Merry, supra note 21 at 897 (noting that colonial governments
created a dual legal system by permitting Africans to retain ―indigenous‖ or
―native law‖ subject to Western legal review by their colonial rulers).
254 See Local Courts Act of 1966, Cap. 29, 4 Laws of Rep. of Zambia (1995)
(stating how customary law interacts with a formal system of justice); Richardson,
supra note 14, at 21.
255 See Mwenda et al., supra note 14 (discussing the Nigerian legal system as
an example ).
256 See Richardson, supra note 14, at 21 (noting that, in addition to the official
local courts recognized by the Zambian government under the Local Courts Act,
there also exist traditional courts which are not officially recognized by the
Zambian government, and which have no link to the local courts or other official
Zambian courts).
257 See generally Anne Hellum, Human Rights and Gender Relations in
Postcolonial Africa: Options and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism, 25 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 635, 635–36 (2000) (discussing broad issues concerning gender,
human rights, and legal pluralism in Africa); Mwenda, supra note 14 (discussing
the Swazi custom of ―sexual cleansing,‖ whereby a widow marries her husband‘s
brother and the deceased‘s property passes to the brother); Mwenda et al., supra
note 14 (discussing the problem of ―property-grabbing‖ under customary law,
where family members of deceased husbands can take property from widows);
Richardson, supra note 14 (identifying the lack of inheritance rights as a key cause
of many women‘s rights issues in Africa).
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courts can also serve as effective mechanisms for enforcing social
order and community norms and can provide useful alternatives to
Western legal frameworks in countries in which the formal legal
infrastructure is relatively undeveloped. In this sense, customary
law both helps to fill gaps in the primarily Western-oriented, statesponsored legal system and to underscore the need for further
development of that system to combat abusive and inequitable
practices.
Zambia‘s local courts, where lawyers are prohibited from
representing clients, are empowered to adjudicate a wide variety of
claims according to customary traditions, including simple tort and
contract actions.258 The majority of claims adjudicated in local
courts, however, involve domestic relationships, including spousal
abuse, divorce claims, and matters of succession.259 Traditional
courts, operating in rural areas, oversee all claims arising from
disputes in their territories,260 including, commonly, witchcraft
trials. Although the use of customary law can provide a vital
means of preserving the cultural heritage of African communities
and of supplementing resource-strapped Western legal systems,
implementation of customary law can also result in shocking
injustice. Sexual purification of widows and property grabbing,
two customs common throughout much of Zambia and much of
Southern Africa, merit particular attention, both because of their
widespread use and because of the enormity of their impact on
African populations.
The rite of sexual purification of widows in Zambia typically
involves sexual intercourse between a male relative of the deceased
husband and the new widow.261 Tradition holds that this practice
cleanses the widow of her late husband‘s spirit, and communities
throughout Southern and East Africa exert great pressure on
widows to submit to the rite soon after their husbands‘ burials.262
258

8–9.

Local Courts Act of 1966, Cap. 29, 4 Laws of Rep. of Zambia (1995) pt. 3, §§

259 The Dilemma of Local Courts in Zambia: A Question of Colonial Legal
Continuity or Deliberate Customary Law Marginalisation, AFRONET, available at
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/library/Online/USP%20Only/Customary
%20Law/Dilemna.htm.
260 See Richardson, supra note 14, at 21 (discussing the Zambian dual legal
system).
261 See Mwenda, supra note 14 (discussing developments in African customs
and laws regarding the sexual cleansing of widows).
262 Id. (noting similar practices in Malawi and Kenya).
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Despite the onslaught of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, adherence to
the custom of sexual cleansing remains prevalent because of the
deeply held belief that it is necessary to prevent insanity and
disease from spreading through a widow‘s village.263 Widows who
resist the practice may be ostracized and prevented from
remarrying, and communities are likely to blame non-compliant
widows for subsequent misfortune that befalls the village.264 In
some areas, use of a condom during the rite of sexual cleansing is
prohibited as incompatible with the tradition.265
Local and traditional courts in Zambia have been active
enforcers of sexual purification rites.266 Traditional courts are
beyond the reach of the formal justice system. Local courts are
subject to oversight from magistrates‘ courts, the High Court, and
the Supreme Court, but despite a 1967 decision in which the High
Court found sexual cleansing repugnant to natural justice and
invalid,267 the same court upheld the practice in 1987, preventing a
widow from remarrying until a member of her late husband‘s
family had intercourse with her.268 Consequently, the practice is
still widespread, and, for obvious reasons, it raises troubling
concerns, both as a matter of public health in a country suffering
terribly from the African AIDS pandemic and in terms of women‘s
sexual autonomy.
Similarly, property grabbing implicates the rights of widows.
The practice, rooted in the traditional treatment of private property
as belonging to an entire extended family rather than to any
particular individual,269 generally entails relatives of a deceased
263 Id. (―[C]hange is coming slowly, village by village, hut by hut. In a region
where belief in witchcraft is widespread and many women are taught from
childhood not to challenge tribal leaders or the prerogatives of men, the fear of
flouting tradition often outweighs even the fear of AIDS.‖).
264 Id. (retelling the story of Fanny, a twenty-three year old Malawian widow
whose deceased husband‘s relatives threatened that if she refused to exorcise her
dead husband's spirit, she would be blamed every time a villager died).
265 Id.
266 See Himonga, supra note 62, at 32–33 (noting that ―traditional‖ local courts
enforce purification rights by awarding damages to actors who claim to have been
aggrieved by people who are alleged to have cibinde, the condition of being
tainted by the spirit of the dead spouse).
267 Kaniki v. Jairus, (1967) ZLR 71 [HC].
268 See Himonga, supra note 62, at 32 (citing Kadakwa v. Siadimbozye
1987/HP/A/10 (Lusaka)).
269 See Mwenda, supra note 14 (noting that under the custom in Swaziland,
women may not own property or enter into contracts without the sponsorship of
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husband taking away items from the marital household, thus
depriving many widows of their only earthly possessions.270 In
Zambia, the practice is tied to the powerful belief in communal
ownership of property, especially in rural areas.271 While it is
plausible that this communitarian approach to property rights
confers real benefits on traditional African communities, it is
undeniable that property grabbing has dispossessed countless
Zambian widows and their children of their primary means of
economic and, in some cases, biological survival.272
Despite Zambia‘s accession to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and
domestic legislation that provides some protection from property
grabbing, the tradition is deeply entrenched.273 In fact, the custom
is so common that frequent involvement by law enforcement
officers complicates attempts to enforce the law.274 Furthermore,

a male relative, and that Swazi custom holds that a deceased husband‘s property
belongs to his family and not to his widow); Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 954–
55.
270 See Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 950, 954–55 (noting that African
customary law is cited as justification for disenfranchising a widow from owning
even property jointly purchased with the deceased husband and observing that
―[i]f an individual with custody of commonly owned property dies, his relatives
will take custody of the property, leaving the deceased‘s widow without any legal
or equitable entitlement to it, unless the deceased‘s extended family assigns her
such rights‖); Richardson, supra note 14, at 19 (discussing similar practices in
Zambia, Botswana, and Ghana).
271 Mwenda, Mumba & Mvula-Mwenda, supra note 14, at 954 (―A Zambian
citizen has no legal capacity to dispose of property that is communally owned
under a will. Such property is instead held in trust for his extended family—that
is, the communal owners.‖).
272 Id. at 951 (―When Tamara Zulu's husband died, leaving her as the sole
breadwinner, she turned to her skills as a tailor to support her five children. Then
came Ms. Zulu's in-laws. A month after the funeral, relying on tribal traditions
that assign inheritance rights to relatives of deceased men, the out-of-towners
swooped in and took everything, including Zulu's only sewing machine. The
suddenly destitute widow scrambled to rent tailoring equipment and feed her
family.‖) (quoting Geraldine Sealey, African Widows Left Destitute By Relatives
Snatching Property, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 13, 2003, at 7).
273 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, Dec. 18, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. See Richardson, supra note 14, at 21
(noting that although Zambia has ratified CEDAW and other international human
rights treaties, the Zambian Constitution and laws continue to legitimize a
discriminatory practices).
274 See Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 952 (noting that police officers, who
are poorly paid, poorly housed, and suffer poor working conditions, often benefit
from the practice of property-grabbing and thus turn a blind eye).
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although Zambia‘s constitution forbids gender discrimination, the
same article makes an exception for customary law.275 Most
Zambian women still marry under customary law, and when they
seek redress for property grabbing or protection from the sexual
purification rite in customary courts, they rarely prevail.276
The prevalent use of customary law certainly helps to fill gaps
in the undeveloped infrastructure of Zambia‘s western legal
system. Additionally, customary law may serve as a vital
preservative of traditional cultural rites, threatened by everencroaching Western sensibilities. Both property grabbing and
sexual purification of widows have been, historically, closely
related to the tradition of levirate marriage, in which the deceased
husband‘s brother marries the new widow, whom he ―inherits‖
along with his brother‘s property.277 Ideally, this practice can
provide a valuable source of protection and security for widows
and their children, ensuring their welfare and their continued
participation in the life of the husband‘s family.278 However,
extreme poverty, has led to the more common scenario of a
widow‘s extended family looting the marital household without
any concomitant fulfillment of traditional obligations to the widow
or her children.279 Additionally, the AIDS pandemic has made the
sexual purification rite devastatingly dangerous.
Like Zambia, other African countries have grappled to find a
balance between traditional norms that preserve cultural heritage
and social harmony and Western legal principles that often conflict
with those norms.280 Like Zambia, when traditional practices in
275 CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) art. 23(1) &
(4)(d) (―Subject to clauses (4), (5) and (7), no law shall make any provision that is
discriminatory either of itself or in its effect . . . Clause (1) shall not apply to any
law so far as that law makes provision . . . for the application in the case of
members of a particular race or tribe, of customary law with respect to any matter
to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the
case of other persons.‖).
276 Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 952 (citing Geraldine Sealey, African
Widows Left Destitute By Relatives Snatching Property, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May
13, 2003, at 7, 10).
277 See Mwenda, supra note 14 (noting that, under the levirate system, the
children conceived after the husband‘s death are considered to be his offspring,
and that, historically, ―the practice of widow inheritance guaranteed many
widows and their children some form of social security‖).
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 See, e.g., Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa,
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 509, 511–513, 558–569 (2010) (criticizing the ability of CEDAW
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other African countries are incompatible with Western principles,
the customs commonly implicate fundamental human rights
concerns for vulnerable minorities. Ultimately, the challenge for
each of these countries is to find a way to safeguard its cultural
legacy and maintain social order, while maintaining respect for
rights considered crucial in the global community.
As Professor Thomas Kelley has argued, wholesale suppression
of traditional practices in a developing country with limited
financial and legal resources could have a devastating impact.281
Aside from any cultural implications, it is true that eliminating
customary legal traditions without a sufficient means of filling the
void left by their absence could result in chaos.282 Nonetheless,
when custom is used as a pretext for oppression of the most
vulnerable members of a society, it is clear that such custom is in
need of reform. Thus, while the use of customary law in Zambia
and the African Charter to reconcile international human rights law and
traditional norms, and analyzing the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights
of Women in Africa for its potential to engage traditional leaders in dialogue
about localized implementation of human rights norms); Jamil D. Mujuzi, Bride
Wealth (Price) and Women’s Marriage—Related Rights in Uganda: A Historical
Constitutional Perspective and Current Developments, 24 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAM. 414,
424–27 (2010) (arguing that, had the Ugandan Constitutional Court considered
Uganda‘s international legal obligations under CEDAW, it would not have
upheld as constitutional the retention of the cultural practice of bride price);
Remigius N. Nwabueze, Securing Widows’ Sepulchral Rights through the Nigerian
Constitution, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141, 147–155 (2010) (comparing, inter alia, the
sepulchral rights of widows in the United States and Kenya, and proposing that
the Nigerian Constitution could serve as the basis for expanding the sepulchral
rights of Nigerian widows); Willem van Genugten, Protection of Indigenous Peoples
on the African Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal
Systems, 104 AM. J. INT‘L L. 29, 57–62 (2010) (discussing the South African
Constitutional Court‘s jurisprudence on indigenous law against the backdrop of
the drafting and domestic reception of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous People in several African countries).
281 See generally Kelley, supra note 209 (offering a focused case study on how
external legal reform has affected the day-to-day lives of people in Niger).
282 In fact, in Zambia, there have been some promising signs of positive
evolution of the sexual purification rite. President Levy Mwanawasa, who served
from 2001 until his death in 2008, urged that coercive sex between widows and
their late husbands‘ relatives should be discouraged. Sharon LaFraniere, AIDS
Now Compels Africa to Reconsider Widows’ ‘Cleansing’, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at
A8. Since then, some of Zambia‘s tribal chiefs have declared they would not
enforce the practice, and some of Zambia‘s tribes have successfully substituted
cleansing rites that do not involve intercourse. Nonetheless, the practice remains
common in much of the country. Id.; Mwenda, supra note 14 (discussing the
decision among several chiefs to ban sexual cleansing out of a concern for the
transmission of HIV/AIDS).
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undoubtedly helps to conserve valuable cultural traditions and to
maintain social order in areas where Zambia‘s Western legal
structure remains undeveloped, some of the inequities of Zambian
customary traditions also underscore the need to develop the
formal legal infrastructure further. An integral component of that
development must be the growth of the legal profession, with a
focus on the introduction of more lawyers into the system.
Ultimately, lawyers have the unique technical expertise to oversee
an expansion of the formal legal regime in a manner that can
maintain Zambian cultural traditions while protecting the
fundamental human rights of those most susceptible to abuse.
Nonetheless, under the best of circumstances, this process will be
slow. In the next section, I will focus on Zambian paralegals in a
discussion of mechanisms within the official justice system that can
help mitigate the effects of Zambia‘s shortage of lawyers.
6.

ALTERNATIVES TO FORMAL LEGAL REPRESENTATION:
PARALEGALS

Customary law can serve as a valuable, albeit imperfect, means
of filling gaps in Zambia‘s resource-strapped legal infrastructure,
ameliorating the effects of the country‘s dearth of lawyers. At least
as administered in traditional courts, however, customary law is
external to Zambia‘s official justice system and does nothing to
improve the plight of those already enmeshed in conflict within
that system, either as parties to civil litigation or as criminal
defendants. Because Zambia does not prohibit non-lawyers from
giving legal advice outside the courtroom, paralegals, have been
able to play an important role in assisting indigent Zambians in
need of legal assistance, both through the direct provision of legal
advice and through pre-conflict education and sensitization
programs.283 While Zambian paralegals cannot supplant the work
of lawyers, they can supplement that work and can mitigate some
of the harm the scarcity of lawyers in the country has caused. Yet
despite the potential benefits of paralegal work, few Zambian
paralegals currently provide legal services to prisoners, the most
vulnerable group within the Zambian justice system.284 Moreover,
283 See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 21; Paralegal Alliance Network, University
of Zambia School of Law, & Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at
30.
284 Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of Law &
Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 30.
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the extreme scarcity of resources, lack of standardization of the
profession, and the limited education of many working as
paralegals in Zambia reduces their impact.
Although Zambia‘s Legal Practitioner‘s Act requires that
anyone representing a criminal defendant in court must have been
admitted to the bar,285 the country has no regulations preventing
non-practitioners from giving mere legal advice outside the
Consequently, unlike American paralegals,287
courtroom.286
paralegals in Zambia can and do operate autonomously.288 These
paralegals are generally affiliated with non-profit, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), most of which engage in
information, education, and sensitization campaigns to make
people aware of their legal rights.289 These sorts of campaigns can
obviate the need for litigation and can reduce the need for more
expensive legal services from lawyers. Some NGOs also use
paralegals to offer basic, individualized legal advice to clients

285 The Legal Practitioners Act provides that non-practitioners may not act as
advocates in any civil or criminal proceedings. Legal Practitioners Act of 1973,
Cap. 30, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (2003) § 42. However, a separate provision
provides that nothing in the Act should be construed to prohibit non-practitioners
from representing clients in court in civil matters, so long as the rules of the court
permit the practice. Legal Practitioners Act of 1973, Cap. 30, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF
ZAMBIA (2003) § 3, cl. (3)(a).
286
Stapleton, supra note 36, at 21 (noting that Zambian paralegals are not
regulated). The Legal Practitioners Act does prohibit some out-of-court legal
activities by non-practitioners, including the preparation, for money, of written
documents relating to legal proceedings and the preparation, for money, of letters
threatening legal action if the recipient does not pay money or comply with a
request to perform or desist from some action. Legal Practitioners Act of 1973,
Cap. 30, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (2003) § 44.
287 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. (1983) (―[L]imiting the
practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal
services by unqualified persons.‖); Thais E. Mootz, Independent Paralegals Can Fill
the Gap in Unmet Legal Services for the Low-Income Community, 5 D.C. L. REV. 189,
197 (2000) (noting that the underlying theory behind unauthorized practice of law
statutes in the United States is that ―only those who have graduated from an
accredited law school and have passed the bar are able to give competent legal
advice‖); Rhode, supra note 17, at 1806 (noting that, despite recommendations
from scholars and practitioners to broaden court access through the provision of
non-lawyer services, sweeping bans on unauthorized practice of law, criminal
prohibitions against unauthorized provision of legal services, and the majority of
significant judicial rulings on the issue militate against expanding the practice).
288 See Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of Law, &
Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 44–45 (noting that Zambian
paralegals frequently operate without any supervision from lawyers).
289 Id. at 30.
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about their particular cases.290
Moreover, because Zambian
paralegals tend to be affiliated with NGOs performing charitable
work, Zambians seeking their assistance generally do not face the
kinds of financial hurdles associated with hiring a lawyer. In fact,
most organizations offering paralegal services do not condition
their work on any sort of means-based testing, and the services
they provide are usually free to clients.291
Though there is no doubt that Zambian paralegals play a vital
role in helping to meet the country‘s legal needs, the profession
cannot, even under the best of circumstances, perform the kind of
sophisticated work or analysis many clients require from a legal
counselor. And in Zambia, the limitations that paralegals would
face anywhere are compounded by a host of problems stemming
from the challenges Zambia faces as a developing country. First,
despite the use of the term ―paralegal‖ to describe a range of
service-providers, there are no common standards encompassing
either the qualifications of Zambian paralegals or the work they
perform.292 This concern might be less significant if Zambian
paralegals were subject to regular oversight by lawyers and acting
merely in support roles. However, because paralegals in Zambia
often give substantive legal advice and operate with little or no
supervision, the lack of standards regulating the profession is
troubling.
Of particular concern, Zambian paralegals have not been
subject to any uniform criteria to determine their eligibility to
operate as paralegals or to dispense legal advice.293 Fortunately,
most legal aid service providers in Zambia require anyone they
hire as a paralegal to have at least a 12th grade education.294
Ideally, this ensures a minimal level of sophistication that reduces
the harm that can result from dissemination of bad legal advice.
Furthermore, several organizations provide trainings for paralegals
that range in duration from five days to nine weeks.295
Nonetheless, some organizations have no formal hiring
requirements for paralegals.296 Given the seriousness of the
290
291
292
293
294
295
296

Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 40–44.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 40.
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responsibilities Zambian paralegals regularly shoulder, Zambia‘s
nascent paralegal services industry would certainly benefit from
standardized admission and training requirements.
In fact, a group of four NGOs calling itself the Paralegal
Alliance Network (PAN) has, in an attempt to professionalize
Zambia‘s community of paralegals, developed a curriculum that
would standardize paralegal training.297 The curriculum entails a
three-year diploma course, which includes six months of clinical
work.298 Though this program would have the benefit of giving all
Zambian paralegals sufficient training to handle their often broad
professional responsibilities, implementation of the curriculum
would be fraught with a number of difficulties and drawbacks.
First, a three-year program would virtually mirror the period
required for earning a Zambian law degree, which involves three
years of legal instruction plus one year in humanities. This
daunting prospect might deter many capable prospective
paralegals from entering the profession.
Perhaps more
importantly, transforming PAN‘s curriculum into a formal
diploma course would require a great investment of human and
financial resources. Given the dependence on donor funding,
upon which all of PAN‘s member organizations and other
Zambian NGOs that use paralegals rely, and given the extreme
scarcity of resources available for education in Zambia generally,
realization of PAN‘s goals may be unrealistically ambitious. As it
is, the severe shortage of resources available to legal aid
organizations using paralegals seriously limits the impact of their
work.
Perhaps the most significant dilemma for the Zambian
paralegal industry to overcome is the lack of adequate incentive
structures to attract and retain qualified paralegals. Most Zambian
paralegals work as volunteers rather than as salaried employees,
and, outside of urban centers, the majority of paralegals have no
computers or vehicles.299 While some organizations can afford to
provide their paralegals with sporadic allowances for telephone
communication and transportation, others cannot afford even these
meager expenses. In some areas, paralegals without offices operate
sitting under trees in the communities they serve.300 This scenario
297
298
299
300

Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
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is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. All paralegal
organizations in Zambia are dependent on funding from external
donors, and much of the money they rely on is allotted for specific
projects and activities.301 There is no reason to believe that funding
will dramatically increase or that donor priorities will shift
significantly anytime soon.
Despite the challenges paralegal organizations in Zambia face,
it would be possible to make better use of the resources currently
available. Specifically, Zambian paralegals are not currently
providing adequate assistance to prisoners, who arguably are the
country‘s most vulnerable population. As of 2008, only two
paralegal organizations worked directly in Zambian prisons, and
both of these organizations focused on rehabilitation and
improvement of prison conditions rather than on provision of
actual legal assistance to prisoners.302 It would be possible,
however, to use paralegal services to make real progress toward
improving the efficiency and fairness of Zambia‘s criminal justice
system.
In Malawi, paralegals have provided a model for how this
might be done, as they have greatly increased the efficiency with
which magistrates‘ courts process criminal claims and have
facilitated the release of large numbers of Malawian prisoners.303
Malawi‘s Paralegal Advisory Service (PAS), composed of
―senior prison officials, police officers, and members of the
judiciary,‖ has played a key role in the success of these efforts by
providing oversight and guidance to participating paralegals
working in prisons to educate prisoners on their rights and on how
to defend themselves in magistrates‘ courts.304
Paralegals
operating under the auspices of the PAS have also helped to divert
large numbers of criminal cases from the overburdened official
justice system toward community-based resolution at the village
level, and they have worked to improve conditions for those still
within the Malawian prison system.305
Finally, Malawian
paralegals have facilitated the establishment of ―camp-courts‖ held
within prison compounds, at which magistrates preside over trials
Id.
Id. at 30.
303 See generally Anderson, supra note 15, at 1 (noting the role of paralegals in
Malawian penal reform efforts).
304 Id. at 4.
305 Id. at 4, 7–8.
301
302
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of prisoners charged with minor offenses and release the prisoners
back to their communities to serve out their sentences.306
Ultimately, the work of Malawian paralegals has led to the release
of thousands of prisoners.307 Based on Malawi‘s success, paralegals
in Benin, Kenya, and Uganda have adopted similar programs.308
Because most NGOs using paralegals in Zambia keep no
comprehensive statistics on their caseloads, it is impossible to
know the extent of their impact with any precision.309 Nonetheless,
Zambian paralegals have undeniably mitigated the effects of the
country‘s paucity of lawyers, and they have managed to do so with
extremely limited resources and training. Even so, the benefits
derived from the work of Zambian paralegals could be increased if
the requirements for entry into the profession were standardized,
and with some reallocation of currently available resources
including efforts to duplicate the successes of paralegals in Malawi.
These issues are discussed in greater detail in the next Section of
this Article.
7.

THE WAY FORWARD

Although some of the problems I have described in this Article
are complex and intractable, African legal reformers could address
many of these challenges through relatively straightforward policy
improvements and through reallocation of the scarce resources
currently available. Because of colonial policies that discouraged
education for native populations, the African legal profession
began to develop only after independence. The monumental task
of building a profession to meet the needs of a new system foreign
to most of the people subject to its rules would be daunting in any
context. Africa‘s poverty has compounded that difficulty in ways
306 Id. at 6 (noting that the program has encouraged magistrates to screen
cases at prisons).
307 Id. at 5 (explaining that these releases were accomplished via ―bail,
discharge of the case, dismissal or . . . compassionate grounds‖).
308 See Penal Reform Int‘l, The Paralegal Advisory Service: A Role for Paralegals in
the Criminal Justice System, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING
THE RULE OF LAW A REALITY 145, 147 (PENAL REFORM INT‘L & BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC
OF THE NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW eds., 2007) (noting ―the common features‖ between
the various programs, including training in ―criminal law and procedure‖).
309 See Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of Law, &
Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 38 (noting that although
some record-keeping mechanisms were utilized including monthly, quarterly or
annual reports and work plans, few of the organizations were able to provide any
detail regarding workload.
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that are impossible to overcome fully without access to resources
currently unavailable to most countries on the continent or their
key institutions.
Numerous factors, including World Bank
conditionalities, donor fatigue, and the indeterminate course of
Africa‘s economic development, make availability of such
resources uncertain for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, real
progress is achievable through a series of reforms focused on
making better use of currently available legal resources to make
legal assistance more accessible to average Africans and on
increasing the number of African lawyers. Because Zambia‘s
problems mirror similar issues throughout the continent, potential
solutions in Zambia provide a possible model for broader, regional
reform.
First, even with the limited number of lawyers now practicing
in Zambia, several amendments to the current legal aid framework
could enhance the quantity and quality of assistance for those most
in need of legal aid in Zambia. Specifically, to provide maximum
protection for Zambian criminal defendants, whose fundamental
rights are more in jeopardy than any other actors in the legal
system, the Legal Aid Board should reduce or eliminate its civil
caseload. At the same time, the National Assembly should amend
the Legal Practitioners Act to allow for contingency fees, which
would make legal assistance from private practitioners available to
more Zambians in civil cases. Additionally, LAZ should work to
implement its resolution to require pro bono work from Zambian
lawyers. Finally, Zambian paralegal organizations could effect
major positive change by emulating paralegals in Malawi who
have helped implement measures to improve the efficiency and
accuracy of Malawi‘s criminal justice system.
Second, Zambia could grow its legal community without
sacrificing the quality of its lawyers by implementing policy
reforms at UNZA and at ZIALE. Reform in the Zambian legal
academy should include increasing the pay of law faculty and
restricting the outside work of law teachers. At the post-graduate
law training institute, ZIALE, changes in hiring practices and
enhanced grading transparency, coupled with possible
amendments to the curriculum, are in order. Implementation of
each of these reforms would be fraught with potential for political
and inertial resistance; convincing relevant stakeholders to
implement them would require sensitivity to the interests of
numerous players in complex systems. Nonetheless, for the most
part, these suggestions would not require dramatic increases in
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available resources. Instead, redistribution of currently available
resources could bring many of this Article‘s recommendations to
fruition.
7.1. Increasing Impact
First, several initiatives could increase the availability of legal
representation for those Zambians most in need of it without
increasing the number of practicing lawyers in the country. One
such initiative would entail a shift in emphasis away from civil
cases at the Legal Aid Board. Scholars and legal activists have
frequently argued that legal assistance in civil cases is a
fundamental component of a modern legal aid system.310 In the
United States in particular, where an estimated eighty percent of
the civil legal needs of the poor are unmet,311 commentators have
often pointed out that the widespread failure to provide legal aid
in civil cases casts a cloud of shame on the country.312 Of course, it
is undeniable that civil cases can imperil extraordinarily important
interests, and there are powerful arguments that a wealthy nation
has a moral responsibility to offer legal aid in many such cases.
Even so, the right to physical freedom is so basic and primary that
it must be prioritized over the vast majority of interests at stake in
civil cases. Yet civil cases comprise nearly fifteen percent of the
Legal Aid Board‘s caseload, and most of those cases are land

310 See, e.g., Bernice K. Leber, The Time for Civil Gideon is Now, 25 TOURO L.
REV. 23, 28 (2009) (noting the ―increased need for funding for civil services [and] a
federal Civil Gideon statute‖ in the United States); Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a
Human Right: Is the United States Going to Join Step with the Rest of the Developed
World, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769, 769 (2006) (commenting on the
American Bar Association‘s resolution urging ―federal, state, and territorial
governments‖ to provide a right to legal counsel for civil litigation when essential
―human needs are at stake‖); Rhode, supra note 17, at 1799 (arguing that access to
representation is vital to the justice system‘s legitimacy because it ensures that
rights are made meaningful); John T. Broderick Jr. & Ronald M. George, A Nation
of Do-it-Yourself Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A21 (reporting on the
increasing occurrence of poor litigants appearing without legal counsel because,
among other reasons, they cannot afford attorneys, they ―do not qualify for legal
aid,‖ and budgets of attorney provision services are dwindling).
311 See Rhode, supra note 17, at 1785 (noting also that forty to sixty percent of
the legal needs of the middle class are unmet).
312 See Leber, supra note 310, at 30 (applauding the efforts to ―fight for access
to justice‖); Lidman, supra note 310, at 789–800 (summarizing the Civil Gideonlike services provided in forty-nine other countries); Rhode, supra note 17, at 1787–
88, 1799 (noting the dearth of funds spent on legal services, as well as the
sometimes irrational allocation of these resources).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012

03 KAHN-FOGEL (DO NOT DELETE)

782

5/9/2012 11:34 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:3

disputes.313 Meanwhile, of the almost 4,500 criminal cases in which
defendants entered pleas in magistrates‘ courts in Lusaka District
in 2009, the Board represented only eighty-nine clients. Given
these dire figures, it is imperative that the Legal Aid Board redirect
its energy toward greater representation of criminal defendants in
magistrates‘ courts.
While reducing or eliminating the civil caseload of the Legal
Aid Board would allow the Board‘s lawyers to provide more
support for criminal defendants, the shift would, of course, leave
some or all of the Board‘s civil clients without representation.
Nonetheless, amendment of the Legal Practitioners Act to allow for
contingency fee payments would more than make up for the
difference; it would, in fact, significantly increase the availability of
lawyers for Zambians engaged in civil litigation. As it is, only a
handful of countries allow the use of contingency fees.314 Yet, by
allowing lawyers to accept payment as a portion of recovered
damages, Zambia, and other African countries, could open the
possibility of legal representation for much larger portions of their
citizenry.
Of course, allowing contingency payments would not mean
that every Zambian with a colorable civil claim would be able to
obtain the services of a lawyer. In countries that do allow
contingency fees, lawyers tend to accept only cases that seem likely
ex ante to have the greatest chances of success and to result in the
most lucrative payouts. Nonetheless, in a country with a per capita
gross national product of only $1070,315 and in which lawyers often
charge hundreds of dollars an hour, there is no question that
changing the law to allow contingency fee payments would result
in a major expansion of legal services available to people other
than the wealthy in Zambia. This simple change in the Legal
Practitioners Act could be one of the most impactful reforms
possible without massive growth of the legal profession itself, and
Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3.
See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 258–59 (2004) (assessing the contingency
fee arrangements found in Canada, England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Irish
Republic, Australia, New Zealand, Dominican Republic, Greece, France, Brazil,
and Japan).
315 See
Data
by
Country—Zambia,
THE
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/zambia (last visited Feb. 14, 2012)
(providing information about Zambia‘s gross national income per capita, among
other economic data).
313
314
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could lead to tremendous improvement of Zambia‘s civil justice
system.
The Law Association of Zambia could also contribute to
increased access to justice by working toward the implementation
of its resolution to require pro bono work from Zambian lawyers.
With only 731 private practitioners in the country, Zambian
lawyers have an extraordinary privilege to operate with limited
competition in a restricted market. For now, failure rates at ZIALE
ensure the continued suppression of that market. That LAZ has
resolved to require pro bono work from Zambian lawyers
represents a progressive move in itself. In the United States, for
example, not only have there been virtually no successful attempts
to require lawyers to do pro bono work, but state bars have also
consistently refused even to attempt to implement mandatory pro
bono policies.316 Meanwhile, some state courts have held that
requiring unpaid legal work violates the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.317
LAZ‘s resolution thus represents a
recognition of the fortunate status of Zambian lawyers, whose high
income levels reflect the limited access to the profession created in
part by flaws in the bar admissions program those lawyers
administer. Nonetheless, over three years after LAZ made its
determination on pro bono requirements, Zambian lawyers are still
not subject to any rule on pro bono work. To implement such a
rule would require amendment of the Legal Practitioner‘s Act.318
Finally, even with the limited number of lawyers practicing in
Zambia, and even with the limited resources available for legal aid
services, Zambian paralegals could make dramatic improvements
in the criminal justice system by emulating the work of paralegals
in Malawi. The success of Malawi‘s paralegals is particularly
salient to efforts to improve access to justice in Zambia because of
the similarities between the two countries‘ justice systems and

316 See Rhode, supra note 17, at 1807–09 (noting that, despite Supreme Court
dicta that pro bono legal service is a public duty, U.S. courts are reluctant to
explicitly require, rather than encourage, lawyers to participate in pro bono
projects).
317 See, e.g., DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987)
(holding that the Takings Clause of the Alaska Constitution prohibited compelled
representation by an individual attorney without just compensation); see also
McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 16 (Iowa 1982) (stating that, under Iowa
and federal constitutional law, lawyers who are compelled to represent indigents
may receive compensation at the public expense).
318 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012

03 KAHN-FOGEL (DO NOT DELETE)

784

5/9/2012 11:34 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:3

resource challenges. In Malawi, for example, as of 2006, there were
only about ―300 qualified lawyers for [a population of] 11 million
people.‖319 At the same time, the government-run Legal Aid
Department employed only four lawyers to serve the entire
country‘s legal aid needs.320 Moreover, inefficiencies in Malawi‘s
justice system were even worse than in Zambia, as half the prison
population in 2006 was on remand, and some prisoners had been
waiting more than seven years for their trials to begin.321
Part of the success of Malawi‘s paralegals depended on their
ability to co-opt crucial actors in the Malawian justice system. By
giving the police, prison officials, and the judiciary key roles in the
PAS, Malawian paralegals protected themselves against the kind of
obstruction that could have confounded their attempts to improve
the system. Most importantly, Malawian paralegals have been
careful not to tread on territory Malawian lawyers would be likely
to perceive as their unique province; despite requests from
magistrates to represent prisoners in court, Malawi‘s paralegals
have demurred, noting that trial advocacy is not their role and that
lawyers must perform that task.322 Any Zambian attempt to
replicate the success of Malawi‘s PAS must similarly include
efforts to gain support and assistance from prison officials, police,
the judiciary, and the bar. If those attempts fail, Zambian
paralegals could, at worst, suffer the fate of American paralegals,
with extremely circumscribed professional roles, including severe
sanctions for dispensation of even basic legal advice.323 Ideally,
however, Zambian paralegals could achieve significant reform of
the criminal justice system, filling some of the titanic gaps left by
the country‘s scarcity of lawyers.
7.2. Increasing the Size of the Bar
In addition to restructuring programs and institutions to
generate greater impact given the current scarcity of lawyers,
reforms in the Zambian legal academy and of the bar admissions
See Anderson, supra note 15, at 2.
Id.
321 Id. at 3.
322 Id. at 6–7.
323 In other African countries, including the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, and Tanzania, lawyers have, at times,
condemned reforms intended to expand access to justice with use of lawyers as
―poor man‘s justice.‖ See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 6 & n.11.
319
320
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process at ZIALE could facilitate the admission of more lawyers to
the Zambian bar. Of course, creating a larger community of legal
practitioners, in and of itself, would not make legal aid services
more accessible to the public. But greater competition in the legal
market would bring down the cost of legal services in general,
which would make legal advice available to more Zambians.
Any examination of the problems that lead most aspiring
lawyers to fail the bar admissions program must begin with the
process by which would-be lawyers train for entry into the
profession, and dysfunction in the Zambian legal academy has,
without question, contributed to high failure rates at ZIALE. A
serious attempt to address the dearth of Zambian lawyers must
include plans to improve conditions at Zambian law schools, with
particular emphasis on making law teachers more professionally
accountable and more available to their students, as well as on
increasing student access to learning materials.
First and foremost, full-time Zambian law teachers must honor
their responsibilities to work full time on teaching and research. A
law school with an absentee faculty cannot possibly fulfill its
commitment to provide students with the attention necessary to
produce graduates prepared to become practicing lawyers.
Furthermore, the teaching of a faculty that generates little or no
scholarship is likely to stagnate; if legal academics are not
constantly engaged in deliberation about how the law can and
should develop, they will be more likely to teach only what the law
is, rather than what it might become. Consequently, the rote,
mechanistic style of teaching common in African law schools will
continue. To that end, UNZA and other law schools in Zambia
should implement policies to discourage law faculty from
pursuing outside work, and they should provide incentives for law
teachers to treat their academic employment as a full-time
commitment and to produce scholarship.
To accomplish these goals, UNZA should end its policy of
allowing law faculty to spend large amounts of time in private
practice. Since 1994, this policy has led law teachers at UNZA to
abandon their responsibilities to the law school, spending the vast
majority of their time at their respective law firms, which provide
far more income than the meager salaries available at UNZA.
Professor Kirsten A. Dauphinais has noted that African law schools
that prohibit law faculty from taking outside jobs have lost their
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best teachers to more lucrative opportunities.324 While it might
well be true that UNZA and other Zambian law schools would lose
some of their best-credentialed faculty if they limited the time fulltime law teachers could spend practicing law, the resulting
scenario would almost certainly be superior to the status quo.
Now, on any given day, even in the middle of a semester, one can
frequently walk down the corridors of the School of Law without
finding a single member of the faculty in his office.325 Now, law
teachers are regularly unavailable for their posted office hours.326
Now, law school lecturers skip large numbers of classes without
notice to students or to law school administrators.327 Surely it
would be better to settle for a mediocre faculty of truly full-time
academics than to limp along with an arguably more accomplished
faculty that refuses to be present at school.
Zambian law schools could also offset the enticement of
lucrative alternative employment opportunities by raising the
salaries of law teachers, in recognition of the very different markets
for legal expertise and for the kind of knowledge academics in
most other disciplines possess. Although it would be infeasible to
make salaries for legal academics equivalent to the incomes of
Zambia‘s most successful private practitioners, it would be
possible to narrow the gap. Without question, raising the salaries
of law teachers in comparison to those of other academics would
be politically difficult. Nonetheless, the move would represent an
acknowledgment of economic reality. Additionally, Zambian
universities could implement the change gradually by weighting
the apportionment of periodic university-wide salary raises.
Increasing student access to books and other learning materials
will also be a crucial element in any serious plan to improve the
quality of Zambian legal education.
As mentioned, the
unavailability of required law books was the most commonly cited
problem amongst UNZA students surveyed on challenges at the

324 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 98 (stating that in East Africa, the
recruitment and retention of law instructors has been particularly difficult
because of the ―low salaries . . . [and] heavy teaching demands‖).
325 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.
326 Id.; see also Survey of Third-Year Law Students at the University of Zambia
School of Law, supra note 150.
327 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110; see also Survey of Third-Year
Law Students at the University of Zambia School of Law, supra note 150.
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School of Law.328 Needless to say, as long as students are unable to
obtain required reading materials for their classes, the quality of
their learning experiences will suffer significantly. At UNZA,
policies already in place may eventually enhance student access to
required reading materials for their classes. As more local faculty
produce casebooks for publication, UNZA press could prove to be
a much more reliable source than British publishers, whose books
are difficult and expensive to obtain from overseas, and are
generally out of stock at Zambian bookstores. Nevertheless, locally
produced casebooks have also proven to be prohibitively
expensive for many law students, and they too are often out of
stock at UNZA‘s bookstore.329 To redress this problem, UNZA and
other Zambian law schools must find ways to increase the supply
and reduce the cost of required reading materials for class. Given
the large number of law students at UNZA and Zambia‘s new law
schools, this goal might be attained by moving to a lower margin,
higher volume business model, which could provide all of
Zambia‘s law students with cheaper books while maintaining
overall profit levels for UNZA Press. Zambian law schools might
achieve similar ends by requiring teachers to distribute copies of
relevant cases, along with their own commentary, or to post such
materials online.330 Whatever solution Zambian law schools
choose, it is imperative that they ensure the availability of learning
materials for the students in their charge.
Unless and until Zambian law schools remedy the problems of
faculty absenteeism and the unavailability of learning materials,
education at these schools will remain substandard. Crucially,
however, at least partial solutions to these dilemmas are possible
despite the financial constraints confronting all Zambian
institutions of higher education. Without changes at ZIALE,
however, even the most effective reforms of Zambian legal

328 See Survey of Third-Year Law Students at the University of Zambia School
of Law, supra note 150.
329 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, supra note 145.
330 For several years, UNZA‘s School of Law administered the Zambia Legal
Information Institute, which was established in 1996 as an Internet repository of
Zambian legal data, including case law and statutes. The site also provided space
for lecturers to post class materials, but few members of the faculty took
advantage of this feature, and the school no longer updates or administers the
site. The Zambian judiciary has expressed interest in taking over administration
of the site but has not yet taken any action. Interview with Anne Chanda, supra
note 110.
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education will likely be insufficient to stimulate growth of the legal
profession sufficiently to meet Zambia‘s potential to produce
qualified new lawyers. To that end, ZIALE should reform its
employment practices by vetting qualified candidates for teaching
positions in an open hiring process.
Moreover, however
accomplished ZIALE‘s lecturers may be as practitioners or jurists,
ZIALE should create systems to monitor its faculty‘s classroom
performance and to hold substandard teachers accountable. This
could be done through classroom visits by qualified legal
academics, teaching evaluations from students, or both.331
It is also worth considering revising ZIALE‘s curriculum to
reflect the original, clinical orientation intended for African bar
admissions programs. First, ZIALE teachers, most of whom are
practitioners with no academic training beyond the bachelor‘s
degree,332 would likely be better prepared to teach using a clinical
format, rather than the academic framework that has developed at
ZIALE. Second, a clinical focus at ZIALE would likely provide
students with better training for the careers as practitioners, for
which the program is meant to groom them.
Finally, though I have discussed it above, it is worth
mentioning again that ZIALE should make its testing and grading
process transparent. Only by allowing students to view failing
exams can ZIALE ensure the accuracy and integrity of its results.
If ZIALE‘s teachers and administrators are confident of the validity
of ZIALE‘s grading process, they have little to lose by opening that
process to scrutiny. On the other hand, ZIALE students, who have
the highest interest in ensuring the accuracy of their results, and
who could learn a great deal from being able to review their failing
papers, have much to gain.
There are no universal solutions to the continental shortage of
qualified lawyers. Further, even significant increases in the size of
the African bar would not be a panacea for the barriers Africans
have faced in accessing legal assistance. In fact, African lawyers
have often been opponents of innovative proposals for increasing
access to justice that they have seen as undermining their
professional monopoly on dispensation of legal expertise.
Nonetheless, lawyers are crucial to the adjudication of complex
331 Currently, ZIALE does not use teaching evaluations or have any
mechanism to monitor the teaching of its instructors. Interview with Palan
Mulonda, supra note 31.
332 Id.
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civil claims and serious criminal matters and, moreover, to
establishing and maintaining societies that function based on the
rule of law, and their numbers are sorely lacking across the
continent. As documented in this Article, many of the problems
that have hindered growth of the Zambian legal profession are
nearly ubiquitous throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, it is likely
that some of the reforms I have recommended to help mitigate the
effects of the scarcity of Zambian lawyers and to stimulate
admission of new lawyers would benefit other countries facing
similar crises. Ultimately, if Zambia‘s relevant institutions adopt
these reforms, they will increase access to justice in the country,
and Zambia‘s improved system could serve as a model for the rest
of the continent and for the world.
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